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 Floods are Canada’s most frequent and expensive natural catastrophe; they are associated 
with the largest losses of any climate-related disaster in Canada (Nastev & Todorov, 2013). As 
the impacts of climate change take effect and urban exposure to flood-prone regions increases, 
the costs associated with flooding are projected to increase to a level that is no longer socially or 
economically feasible (Sandink, 2009). As a result, policymakers in Canada are facing mounting 
pressure to better manage flood risk. Flood Risk Management (FRM) is an approach that is 
widely cited in flood policy literature as a robust framework to mitigate the risks associated with 
flooding. FRM encompasses several key elements that define it as an effective flood policy 
directive and asserts an overall shift to risk-based management practices (Henstra & 
Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Despite widespread support within flood policy research, the uptake of 
FRM in Canada remains slow and there has been little research done to determine how political 
leaders understand these measures and their objectives. This research aims to determine how 
flooding is being discussed as a policy issue within the Canadian political sphere, through 
examining how Canadian political discourse frames flooding as a policy problem, and the role of 
FRM in political discourse in practice.  
 A content analysis on flood discourse from the Hansard Index of the Canadian House of 
Commons examined connections between political discourse on floods and FRM framing, 
through determining the presence or absence of variables that indicate effective FRM dialogue. 
A codebook was developed based on key indicators from flood policy literature to explore this 
relation, and contained the following categories, (1) Flood Identification, (2) Party Speaking on 
Flooding, (3) Problem Framing, (4) Climate Change Framing (5) Flood Risk Management 
Focus, and (6) Stakeholder Identification. A statistical analysis was then performed to determine 
the relation between the ideology of Canadian political parties and FRM frames. 
 The results indicate that despite the recent shifts in discourse that is proactive to FRM, 
there remains several policy considerations that need to be met to effectively implement 
sustainable flood management policy, including stakeholder diversification, consideration for 
vulnerable populations, and a need for more political discourse frames which are consistent with 
FRM literature. Further, flood discourse is largely event-based, rather than risk based. indicating 
that discussions surrounding flooding are initiated by the occurrence of a flood event. The results 
also show that major political events are drivers of a change in discourse, and that political 
representation and ideology influences flood discourse.  
 This study contributes to an improved understanding of FRM in practice in Canada, and 
the elements of FRM that are prevalent within political discourse and those that remain priorities 
to implement a robust flood management framework in Canada. This research could be expanded 
upon to evaluate management practices for other climate-related phenomenon, as well as 
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Floods are associated with the largest social and economic losses of any climate-related 
phenomenon in Canada (Nastev & Todorov, 2013). Average annual rainfall is surpassing 
historical norms, and as the effects of climate change continue to proliferate and urban exposure 
to flood-prone regions increases, health impacts and property damages linked to floods will 
continue to grow (Burn & Whitfield, 2016). Beyond property damage, other significant 
consequences include strains on public services such as power outages, transportation delays and 
backlogs (Armenakis & Nirupama, 2014).  
Increases in drought, extreme rainfall, high temperatures and strong winds are expected 
as global climates continue to change. Canadian flood management infrastructure has been 
implemented with the assumption that climatic conditions are predictable and repetitive. 
Consequently, structural defenses and overland flood control infrastructure are inadequate to 
mitigate severe flooding events. Residents in flood-prone regions are likely to experience more 
frequent and severe damages from flood events, including home flooding, damaged 
infrastructure, sewer overflows and higher instances of stormwater runoff. These damages are 
becoming fiscally and socially unsustainable and are overwhelming governmental flood 
management programs (Sandink, 2009). 
Increasingly, decision-makers are facing pressure to manage flood risk better. Flood Risk 
Management (FRM) is an approach that is highly cited in academic literature as an effective 
policy framework for managing increased instances of severe flood events (Koslov, 2019; 
Thistlethwaite, 2017). Despite these technical frameworks being widely apparent in academic 
literature, FRM implementation remains inconsistent across Canada due to a lack of political 







leaders understand these measures and their objectives, insurers, high risk communities and FRM 
advocates lack appropriate guidance on their roles and responsibilities in reducing flood risk.  
To date, research on public opinion and media discourse has found little evidence of 
FRM in practice (Thistlethwaite et al., 2019). It is unclear whether Canadian politicians are 
discussing flooding as a policy problem, and the extent to which outcomes of flood policy 
research are apparent in political discourse. There has also been little research undertaken to 
understand how political ideologies in Canada align with FRM, and the factors that act as the 
impetus for flood discussion in government forums such as parliament. This study aims to 
provide insight on these matters, through addressing the following questions:  
1. How does Canadian political discourse frame flooding as a policy problem? 
2. What is the role of FRM in Canadian political discourse in practice? 
This research aims to determine how flooding is being discussed as a policy issue among 
key decision-makers in the Canadian political sphere. To begin, this study develops a literature 
review that examines flood management practices in Canada and the influence of discourse on 
flood policy. Part one of the literature review begins by describing flooding as a policy problem 
in Canada, historic practices in Canadian flood policy, and how they have developed over time. 
The main criticisms of Canadian flood management strategies are also summarized to provide 
context for the need for a more sustainable approach to disaster policy. FRM theory is then 
introduced as a framework that is widely regarded in flood policy literature. The role that it 
currently plays in Canadian flood management is then examined.  
The latter part of the literature review focuses on discourse theory, and the role of media 
and policy discourse in determining flood policy outcomes. Specifically, this chapter examines 







salience of flooding as a policy problem. Further, it examines the roles of key actors, such as 
politicians and decision-makers, the media, and the general public, in prioritizing flooding and its 
associated policy problems within discourse. 
The third chapter of this study outlines the methods that have been used throughout the 
course of the study. Specifically, this study examined parliamentary discourse among politicians 
within the Canadian federal government. Using records collected from the Hansard Index, a 
database that documents parliamentary dialogue, a keyword search using the word “flood” 
informs the analysis. This research employs a content analysis, using a codebook containing 
predetermined variables informed by the literature review, to evaluate how Canadian politicians 
are discussing flooding and the degree to which these discussions align with the principles of 
FRM. The codebook focuses on six primary categories identified as pertinent to effective FRM 
discourse based on findings from the literature review, including (1) Flood Identification, (2) 
Party Speaking on Flooding, (3) Problem Framing, (4) Climate Change Framing (5) Flood Risk 
Management Focus, and (6) Stakeholder Identification. The results from the content analysis 
were then evaluated using statistical analysis to determine significant relationships between flood 
risk framing and political ideology. 
The fourth chapter of this study contains the findings of this research and a discussion of 
the results. Organized using the predetermined categories stated above, the results outline the 
variables that are catalysts for discussions on flooding (such as location, representation in 
parliament, flood occurrences), the elements of FRM that are most prevalent in policy discourse, 
the alignment of FRM principles with policy discourse, as well as the degree of consideration for 
stakeholders in flood management practices. Throughout this chapter, the results are also 







discussions on flooding and large-scale flood events or political changes. The results are then 
summarized in the final chapter of this study.  
This research offers insights about the current state of flood management policy in 
Canada, and the extent to which the principles of FRM are present in political discourse 
concerning flooding. Further, it highlights the aspects of FRM that are most prevalent in policy 
discourse, as well as how they have changed over time. Elements of FRM that are largely absent 
from flood policy discourse are also identified to determine whether flood management discourse 
is evolving to incorporate aspects of FRM, as well as the degree to which politicians align flood 
management practices with principles cited within academic literature. Finally, the study seeks to 
identify factors that initiate discussions on flooding and whether discussions are reactive to a 


















2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 PUBLIC POLICY AND FLOODING IN CANADA  
 2.1.1 FLOODING IN CANADA 
Floods have become Canada’s most frequent and costly natural catastrophe. Continued 
instances of drought, extreme rainfall, high temperatures and strong winds are expected as global 
climates continue to change (Nastev & Todorov, 2013; Sandink, 2009). As the effects of climate 
change continue to proliferate and urban exposure to flood-prone regions increases, health 
impacts and property damages linked to floods will continue to grow (Burn & Whitfield, 2016). 
Across Canada, there are large variations in geographic, climatic, and socio-economic 
conditions. As the effects of climate change take effect, different regions across Canada are 
projected to experience uneven degrees of warming and exposure to extreme weather events. 
Furthermore, socio-economic discrepancies across the country are likely to result in a varied 
capacity of regions to adapt to these changes. Regions with limited access to resources and 
services, and low economic diversity will likely experience higher losses and strains on local 
infrastructure. Ultimately, this makes it difficult to predict and understand the effects that climate 
change will have on Canadian infrastructure and human health, and presents challenges in 
implementing consistent, national climate change adaptation and mitigation approaches (Boyle et 
al., 2013).  
A. SIGNIFICANT FLOOD EVENTS IN CANADA 
For the last century, floods have been responsible for more social and economic costs 
than any other natural disaster in Canada. Of the 287 major flood events from 1900 to 2012, 62% 
occurred in just four provinces: Ontario, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Manitoba. Further, the 







after 1970 (Nastev & Todorov, 2013). Within the last few decades alone, Canada has 
experienced its costliest natural disasters.  
Two of the largest Canadian flooding events in the twentieth century occurred in the late 
1990s. In 1996, large-scale flooding occurred in the Saguenay region in Quebec, resulting in 
severe damages to over 2600 homes and 10 fatalities (Nastev & Todorov, 2013). The Saguenay 
Flood resulted in $800 million in direct financial losses, and was the first flood in Canada to 
experience total losses amounting to $1 billion (Nastev & Todorov, 2013; Oliver & Wiebe, 
2003). Shortly after the Saguenay Flood, Manitoba experienced the Red River Flood in 1997. 
This flood event displaced more than 75,000 individuals, and extended more than 256,000 
hectares (Oliver & Wiebe, 2003). The Red River Flood resulted in $150 million in direct 
economic costs, and amounted to $450 million in property and infrastructure damage (Nastev & 
Todorov, 2013; Oliver & Wiebe, 2003). 
Five of the largest ten floods on the Red River in Manitoba have occurred in the last 19 
years, with severe floods in this region in 2009, 2011 and 2014 (Blais et al., 2016). Total 
estimated costs for each flood event amounted to approximately $76.5 million, $700 million, and 
$1.1 billion, respectively. As a direct result of these events, 3000 residents were evacuated in 
2009, 2543 in 2011, and 560 in 2014, totalling more than 6000 people displaced from their 
homes in a 5 year time-span. Over the course of these floods, vital infrastructure including 
bridges, roads and highways was damaged, and over 25% arable of farmland was unusable 
during the 2014 growing season, amounting to $1 billion in lost revenue (Government of 
Canada, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c).  
In 2013, Calgary, Alberta experienced Canada’s costliest natural disaster with $6 billion 







disaster assistance payments amounted to over $1 billion, and insurance payouts totalled over 
$1.7 billion. This event is responsible for the largest evacuation in the history of Alberta, with 29 
states of emergency announced and approximately 100,000 residents displaced. The flood had 
direct impacts on vital services including clean water distribution, access to electricity, main 
highways; and had an effect on more than 4000 businesses, ultimately causing a reduction in the 
province’s GDP by $550 million (Government of Canada, 2018d).  
More recently, severe spring floods caused significant damage in Canada. In 2017, 
Ottawa and Southeastern Quebec were inundated with heavy floods as a result of increased 
rainfall and runoff (Ottawa River Regulation Planning Board, 2018). This flood event amounted 
to an estimated $223 million in insured damages, in addition to costs incurred by uninsured 
properties and governments, and displaced more than 4000 residents (IBC, 2017; Teufel et al., 
2019). Two years later, flooding across Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick, resulted in an 
estimated $208 million in insured damages, with Quebec bearing the largest sum of these costs at 
$127 million (IBC, 2019a).    
A. FLOOD RISK IN CANADA 
Canadian flood risk is expected to increase, and it is estimated that average annual losses 
from flooding could rise by as much as 137% by mid-century and 300% by the end of the 
century as a result of climate change (Thistlethwaite, Minano, et al., 2018). The Parliamentary 
Budget Officer approximates that flooding will trigger annual federal disaster assistance payouts 
of $673 million in the near future (PBO, 2016). Flood risk is surpassing levels that society is 
willing to accept due to the mounting costs and damages associated with flooding, increasing 
risk posed to Canadian property and infrastructure, and increases in public spending on DFAA 







By definition, flood risk is “a function of both the likelihood of an event occurring and 
the consequences of that event occurring” (Lyle & Mills, 2016, p. 344). Hence, it is possible to 
use risk to categorize and predict a community’s potential exposure to a flood event occurring. 
Regions that are sparsely populated with no exposure to large bodies of water would be seen as 
“low-consequence” and “low-likelihood”, and ultimately are at low risk for flooding (Lyle & 
Mills, 2016, p. 344). Comparatively, a low-lying region located near a floodplain with a dense 
population and concentrated insured assets would be a “high-consequence” and “high-
likelihood” region, putting it at high risk from a flood event (Lyle & Mills, 2016, p. 344). Canada 
is geographically diverse and as a result, communities have variable exposure to flood risk 
associated with coastal floods, snowmelt runoff, storm-rainfall, ice jams, natural dams, coastal 
flooding, urban flooding, groundwater flooding and structural failure (Boyle et al., 2013; 
Sandink et al., 2010).  
Canadian coastal regions are exposed to many triggers for flood events including sea 
level rise, storm surges, as well as hurricanes (City of Vancouver, 2018; Tucker, 2000). 
According to 2011 predictions, sea level along Canadian coasts is projected to rise 1 metre by the 
end of the century, and 2 metres by the year 2200 as a result of rising global temperatures (City 
of Vancouver, 2018). It is difficult to predict the precise extent, frequency, and magnitude of sea 
level rise, thereby presenting challenges in long-term management strategies. However, it is 
certain that flood risk to coastal communities and infrastructure located in low-lying regions is 
increasing due to sea-level rise (Lyle & Mills, 2016). Additionally, factors such as increased 
affluence, buyer interest in coastal and waterfront properties, urbanization within high-risk 
regions, rising population, and land-use shifts further expose these regions to flood risk (Boyle et 







Cities throughout Canada have also seen increased instances of urban flood events within 
the past two decades (Sandink, 2016). Damage associated with urban flooding are the result of 
high concentrations of infrastructure, people and impermeable surfaces, resulting in increased 
instances of property damage, sewer backup and infiltration (Sandink, 2009). Household water 
damage associated with basement flooding and insufficient plumbing systems has become the 
largest source of property insurance claims in Canada, costing insurance companies $1.7 billion 
in 2012 alone (Sandink, 2013, 2016). In 2013, Aviva Canada announced that water damages 
comprised 51% of insurance payouts, and that these claims had increased from $8944 to $20 537 
between 2003 to 2013 (Sandink, 2016).  
Increased damages and costs associated with flooding have implications for Canadian 
governments and insurers. To effectively mitigate flood risk, public policy must account for 
factors such as land use planning, community density, infrastructure reliability as well as the 
management of and coastal flooding. Additionally, insurers have to be prepared with policies 
that account for rising losses endured from flood events (Sandink et al., 2014). Increasing flood 
risk in Canada presents a challenge to its flood management strategies which have evolved 
considerably over time. 
 2.1.2 THE EVOLUTION OF FLOOD MANAGEMENT IN CANADA  
Flood management efforts in Canada have largely framed society as external to flood 
events, creating a ‘human against nature’ paradigm. Categorizing flooding under the ‘natural 
disaster’ umbrella implies that the consequences of flooding are beyond the control of humans 
and their activities; however, in reality, humans interact with surrounding environments to either 
mitigate or exacerbate the effects of overland flood events (Gober & Wheater, 2015). Socio-







(Sivapalan et al., 2012). Compared to traditional paradigms that flood management measures are 
external to water cycle processes, socio-hydrology promotes the view that human actions play a 
large role in water dynamics (Sivapalan et al., 2012).  
Put simply, human activities have implications for flood risk. Some examples include 
urbanization, which results in increased runoff and land-use changes involving agricultural 
expansion, which affect fluvial processes. In fact, the 2013 floods in Calgary, which are reported 
as Canada’s costliest natural disaster, resulted in part from poorly planned flood plain 
development (Gober & Wheater, 2015). Ultimately, “flood risk results from complex interactions 
between extreme events, human changes to the natural environment, human perceptions and 
responses to risk, and the capacity of human institutions to reduce and manage risk” (Gober & 
Wheater, 2015, p. 4783). Framing disaster as a policy problem is critical in enacting effective 
management strategies. Moreover, emphasizing flooding as a ‘natural disaster’ alleviates 
decision-makers of the responsibility of ineffective planning and flood management (Bogdan et 
al., 2020).  
Flood management in Canada has historically involved three key stages including; (1) 
planning, where structural and preventative measures are undertaken to minimize damage prior 
to a flooding event; (2) flood emergency management, whereby flood risk is consistently 
monitored and involves the daily maintenance of flood controls and (3)  post-flood remediation, 
which comprises recovering losses after an overland flood event (Akter & Simonovic, 2005). 
Increasingly, the literature is emphasizing the importance of a risk-based approach towards 
managing floods, rather than relying on structural defenses that traditionally comprised the 








A.   THE STRUCTURAL CONTROL ERA 
Until recently, Canada relied heavily on structural defenses to manage flood risk and 
minimize damages associated with flood events. The implementation of these defenses was 
based on “specified return period” of the hazard or a “repeat of a specified historical event”, in 
order to minimize flood risk to a level that is deemed acceptable (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 
2017a, p. 9). These measurements formed the basis of policy implementation, which aimed to 
stop or prevent flood damages. To this day, estimates of ‘1-in-100-year-flood’ events are used to 
measure a region’s susceptibility to flooding, which indicates that a region has a 1% chance of 
experiencing a flood of this extent annually (Thistlethwaite et al., 2017). Subsequently, structures 
such as dams, dykes, sandbags, floodwalls, and levees are constructed that act as physical 
barriers to flooding (Ran & Nedovic-Budic, 2016). 
The first part of the twentieth century saw the beginning of the implementation of large-
scale ‘water control’ projects such as hydroelectric dams and drainage basins. Initially, these 
structures were not intended to be flood defences, and instead serve as facets for recreation, 
irrigation and wildlife conservation; however, they ended up decreasing flood peaks and were 
recognized as effective in managing floods. At that time there was no formal water policy in 
Canada, and the Constitution Act contained no particular mention of flood management 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2009). The ambiguous constitutional responsibility 
incentivized neither the federal nor provincial governments to take the lead on flood control 
efforts and failed to hold any particular level of government accountable for flood management 
(Shrubsole, 2000; Shrubsole et al., 2003). 
In 1953, Canada enacted the Canada Water Conservation Assistance Act (CWCAA); its 







Change Canada, 2009). Prior to this Act, municipalities and local residents undertook the 
majority of flood management efforts. The CWCAA empowered the federal government to play 
a larger role in flood prevention measures, and it aimed to alleviate the financial burden of flood 
management infrastructure on provinces and local governments (Shrubsole et al., 2003). This 
legislation permitted the federal government to cover 37.5% of the cost of large-scale structural 
defenses for the “conservation and control of water” (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 
2009).  
Financial assistance from the federal government as per the CWCAA was intended for 
structural defences, and as a result, flood mitigation efforts from the 1950s to the mid-1970s 
were largely focused on this approach. During this time, major flood defenses were constructed 
primarily in the Metro Toronto and Upper Thames regions in Ontario with the federal 
government contributing an estimated $15 million (Bruce, 1976). Additionally, more defenses 
were constructed under “Special Agreement”, whereby the government contributed more than 
the 37.5% limit outlined in the CWCAA (Bruce, 1976, p. 7). These included the Red River 
Floodway, with a total cost of $63 million and a federal contribution of $37 million; the 
Shellmouth Reservoir where the federal government paid $5.5 million of the total cost of $11 
million; the Assiniboine River Diversion with federal inputs of $9 million of an $18 million 
total; and dykes throughout the Red River Region for which the federal government contributed 
$1.9 million of a $2.7 million total (Bruce, 1976).  
These structures have played a role in reducing damages from severe flood events. For 
instance, it is estimated that the Red River Floodway prevented $200 million in damages during 
the Winnipeg Floods of 1974, and $500 million in damages were prevented in Manitoba’s 1997 







has prevented $8 billion in damages (Public Safety Canada, 2008). Some of these structural 
defenses have been expanded in recent years. One example is the expansion of the Red River 
Floodway in 2005, where $665 million was invested to increase the capacity of this floodway to 
withstand a 1-in-700-year flood event (Blais et al., 2016).  
Despite the benefits of protecting historical development, a hazard-based approach is 
largely criticized in the literature. Structural defenses are often designed based on the probability 
of a disaster, and do not take into consideration the exposure or vulnerability of a region to a 
flood event. This results in poor allocation of investment in mitigation strategies and uninformed 
prioritization of risk reduction. Furthermore, the construction and operation of structural 
defenses are a large financial burden. Flood control structures mislead individuals, as they give 
the illusion of complete flood protection, and they do little to discourage migration to high-risk 
regions. Additionally, disaster assistance, which provides financial support after structural 
defenses fail, provides little incentive for people to adopt personal protective measures and 
engage in risk-reducing behaviours or seek to rebuild in safer locations (Henstra & 
Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Finally, post-flood remediation emphasizes returning to a “pre-flood 
state”, which puts the affected communities at risk of future flooding as no further mitigation 
measures are undertaken (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a, p. 7; Jakob & Church, 2011; 
Shrubsole, 2000; Shughart, 2011).  
B. THE NON-STRUCTURAL CONTROL ERA 
While flood management strategies have traditionally relied on structural measures, a 
combined method has been identified as most effective in practice. Successful flood management 
policy includes the use of both structural and non-structural mechanisms. Non-structural 







protective barriers, they are associated with environmental and economic drawbacks, as noted 
above. Non-structural defenses allow for efficient planning and policy to be developed, but are 
sensitive to the regions in which they are implemented (Ran & Nedovic-Budic, 2016).  
In 1970, the Canada Water Act (CWA) was implemented and became the primary 
legislation outlining the role of the federal government in managing floods in Canada, effectively 
replacing the CWCAA which was viewed as too “restrictive” as assistance covered limited water 
uses, assistance was inadequate, and planning did not allow for wide-ranging stakeholder 
engagement. This Act introduced a method that was less dependent on structural defenses to 
manage flood risk. New approaches outlined in the CWA include incorporating “all water uses 
and their economic, social and environmental importance”; consulting affected parties and 
residents; incorporating geographic features, such as waterways, in planning; and non-structural 
flood management techniques should be incorporated in policy (Environment and Climate 
Change Canada, 2009).  
Non-structural approaches were incorporated into the Flood Damage Reduction Program 
(FDRP) in 1975. This new program involved a series of renewable 10-year agreement between 
the federal and provincial governments (Oulahen, 2014; Shrubsole et al., 2003). Federal support 
and regulation through this program allowed for an approach that prioritized non-structural 
measures, such as flood hazard mapping, the identification of flood-prone regions and a 
reduction in development within high risk areas (Oulahen, 2014). Furthermore, the FDRP 
outlined important principles, such as the need to harmonize mitigation efforts between federal 
and provincial governments; that flood maps should be developed to identify high-risk regions 
and be made accessible to the public; provincial investment and developments should be 







regions which are identified as flood-prone (Bruce, 1976). Public awareness was also a key 
factor outlined in the FDRP (Shrubsole et al., 2003).  
Through the FDRP, each province has been left responsible for maintaining their flood 
hazard maps, which has resulted in national inconsistencies of flood plain investment and 
development (Oulahen, 2014). Flood maps provide important information regarding land-use 
planning, assist with the identification of high-risk areas, and inform infrastructure and 
development (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2018). However, provinces and municipalities have 
demonstrated varying levels of engagement with maintaining flood maps (Oulahen, 2014). In a 
recent study undertaken on the quality of flood maps, 62% of maps surveyed were ‘low quality’, 
based on their inability to meet basic criteria. These criteria included fundamental components of 
a hazard map, including the legibility of map legends and flood zones, as well as the ability of 
readers to identify landmarks and information pertaining to their property (Henstra, Minano, et 
al., 2019). In fact, some municipalities still use flood maps that have not been updated since they 
were originally produced by the FDRP over four decades ago (Oulahen, 2014). As a result, there 
is a need for improved hazard maps that are accessible and comprehensible to the public, and 
that can be used to effectively inform flood management strategies (Henstra, Minano, et al., 
2019).  
Another key component of flood recovery in Canada has been the Disaster Financial 
Assistance Arrangements (DFAA), introduced in 1970 by the Government of Canada (Public 
Safety Canada, 2018). Through the DFAA program, the federal government assists with disaster 
recovery costs when they exceed the financial means of the provincial governments (Henstra & 
Thistlethwaite, 2017a; Public Safety Canada, 2018). Often, these payouts are needed where 







Thistlethwaite, 2017a). DFAA is used to cover expenses such as rebuilding infrastructure and 
public property to their pre-flood state, compensating individuals, businesses and farms for 
damages to their properties, and funding evacuation procedures (Public Safety Canada, 2018).  
While DFAA has often been regarded as a key component of post-flood recovery, it does 
little to minimize flood risk as further preventative measures are scarcely implemented when 
restoring a community to its ‘pre-flood state’ (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Moreover, 
DFAA spending has increased significantly in the past decade, rendering it economically 
unfeasible. For instance, average annual DFAA payments more have more than doubled in the 
past two decades, with an increase from an average of $118 million per year between 1996 and 
2011 to an average of $280 million annually between 2012 and 2015, overreaching its budget of 
$100 million per year (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a; Public Safety Canada, 2015).  In fact, 
the federal government pays approximately 90% of disaster relief costs after a severe flood event 
(Groeneveld, 2006). Government programs are intended for disaster relief, whereas insurers 
provide the financial means for the restoration of damaged properties after flooding events occur 
(Sandink et al., 2016). Disaster assistance programs are important tools in recovering from losses 
caused by flooding events, but they limit perceptions of individual responsibility by decreasing 
the incentive for individual flood protection measures, encourage development and re-building in 
high-risk areas, and are no longer financially sustainable (Sandink et al., 2016; Thistlethwaite & 
Henstra, 2017).  
Faced with predicted increases in costs associated with flooding, municipalities have 
been obligated to increase their contributions to disaster recovery costs, while the federal 
government has tightened the economic threshold for accessing the DFAA  after a disaster 







term return on their investment, they neglect to pay for flood prevention measures, assuming a 
flood event will not affect their homes within a few years. Moreover, property owners have 
become reliant on government disaster assistance as a means of restoring their homes after a 
flood event (Kunreuther, 2001).  
Flood insurance has been widely regarded as an effective flood management tool capable 
of addressing weaknesses in government-run disaster assistance programs. However, there is a 
lack of uptake of private flood insurance. Flood insurance is not included in residential property 
insurance, and therefore remains costly for homeowners to purchase particularly for those 
residing in high-risk areas (Thistlethwaite, 2016). In addition, many Canadian residents are under 
a false impression that damage due to flooding is covered in their home insurance (Oulahen, 
2014). Among 2100 Canadian property owners surveyed in 2004, nearly 70% were unaware that 
their home insurance policies did not cover damage as a result of overland flooding (Sandink et 
al., 2010).  
This has placed a large burden on governments to recover property damages as a result of 
flooding through disaster assistance, and more recently through property buyouts. In response to 
the reluctance of Canadians to purchase coverage for flood events, insurers are pushing for the 
federal government to undertake “risk-based approaches to flood risk management” to better 
mitigate the increasing costs associated with damage from overland flood events (Henstra & 
Thistlethwaite, 2017a, p. 7).  
Despite the incorporation of structural and non-structural defenses in managing flood 
risk, there remains a need to implement an approach to flood management in Canada that allows 
for effective risk-sharing and allocation of resources. Current flood mitigation and recovery 







ineffective at mitigating flood risk through untargeted investment to flood defenses, poor 
communication of risk, and through failing to enforce limitations on development in high-risk 
regions (Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 2017). Additionally, current flood management practices 
poorly distribute the burden of flood risk and assert heavy reliance on disaster assistance. The 
literature asserts the need for a risk-based approach to flood management policy in Canada. 
 2.1.3 FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT 
A.   FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT THEORY 
Risk management is an emerging approach towards flood management policy. This 
approach uses analysis tools to reduce and share the responsibility of the risk posed by a 
particular flooding event (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). By definition, Flood Risk 
Management (FRM) comprises the “decisions and actions undertaken to analyze, assess and (to 
try to) reduce flood risks” (Schanze et al., 2006, p. 4). FRM strategies should be all-inclusive, as 
well as ‘continuous’, implying that there is a need to regularly evaluate flood risk and mitigation 
measures (Schanze et al., 2006).  
FRM represents a shift away from hazard-based models of managing flood risk (Henstra 
& Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Instead, FRM uses risk as a basis of informing management strategies 
which is defined as factor of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability (Kron, 2003). 
1.  Hazard: the identified threat (i.e. flooding) and the likelihood of its occurrence 
(Kron, 2003; Nelson et al., 2007) 
2. Exposure: the potential for loss of people, valued assets (resources, infrastructure, 
social/cultural capital), and environmental assets (services, ecosystems, species)  in a 








3. Vulnerability: the predisposition of a region to be negatively impacted by the hazard; 
based on a variety of factors such as risk threshold, ability to adapt, and proneness to 
hazard (IPCC, 2018; Kron, 2003; Nelson et al., 2007) 
In theory, calculating flood risk in a region involves multiplying these three factors (risk 
= hazard x exposure x vulnerability), and designing policy based on this value (Henstra & 
Thistlethwaite, 2017a; Kron, 2003). However, managing risk becomes more complicated as 
floods are not isolated incidences that are inherently predictable. Rather, flood events involve 
many different variables, and require management efforts from a wide variety of stakeholders, 
from local residents to government officials and decision-makers (Plate, 2002).  
FRM requires the reduction of flood risk in a current system, as well as planning a system 
to minimize future flood risk (Plate, 2002). Throughout the literature, FRM generally involves 
three main steps, including:  
1. Risk Analysis, where potential hazards, and the vulnerability and exposure of 
communities to the hazard are determined;  
2. Risk Evaluation, where the level of risk is weighted, and ‘acceptable’ levels are 
determined; and 
3. Risk Reduction & Mitigation, which involves implementing ‘risk controls’ to decrease 
risk to a level that is acceptable (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a; Plate, 2002; 
Schanze et al., 2006). 
As a first step, risk analysis is used to identify risk information based on past, present and 
future flood events. Prevailing methods for risk analysis in academic literature include the use of 
risk maps to identify the likelihood of flood events and potential impacts to communities, and 







2006). Other areas of risk can be highlighted through the occurrence of flood events, such as 
weaknesses in structural defenses (Plate, 2002). Uncertainty must be accounted for in 
determining risk, as analyses typically only account for factors that are quantifiable. As the 
climate continues to change rapidly, the high degree of uncertainty presents challenges to 
estimating flood risk, and predictions of indirect economic, social and ecological consequences 
are limited (Schanze et al., 2006). Constant updates to information are necessary to account for 
changes in a system, such as the introduction of new data, academic developments, or changes in 
landscape due to land use or urbanization (Plate, 2002).  
Risk evaluation is identified as the second step in FRM procedure. This step is concerned 
with the “perception and evaluation” of risk, and ultimately shapes the decisions that are made 
for managing the system (Plate, 2002; Schanze et al., 2006, p. 6). Risk evaluation uses the 
experiences of individuals, societal perceptions and the viewpoints of stakeholders to determine 
acceptable levels of flood risk (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a; Schanze et al., 2006). It 
predominantly focuses on the majority view of ‘costs’ (negative costs and mitigation efforts) and 
‘benefits’ in developing FRM measures. However, it is worth noting that this approach fails to 
account for intangible losses, such as casualties and mental and physical health issues, and 
therefore requires consideration in FRM decision-making (Schanze et al., 2006). Tolerable Risk, 
which defines the level of risk that society is willing to accept to protect certain assets, is also a 
common practice used to evaluate risk in decision making. The ‘As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable’ (ALARP) principle, which is a key factor in determining Tolerable Risk, asserts that 
any remaining risk should be reduced as far as possible (Bowles, 2003). 
The third step is risk reduction and mitigation, which uses measures to reduce 







Thistlethwaite, 2017a; Schanze et al., 2006). Risk controls are “specific measures – processes, 
policies, devices, or practices – implemented to modify risk” (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a, 
p. 7). Specifically, these controls involve decreasing involvement with high risk activities, 
removing and mitigating hazards, sharing losses among stakeholders, and acknowledging 
beforehand that certain losses will occur from risk (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Risk 
controls are a key policy consideration in FRM. Schanze et al. (2006) argue that these controls 
are relevant at ‘pre-flood’, ‘flood event’, and ‘post-flood’ stages to reduce risk.   
FRM requires a shift towards a diversification of policies and stakeholders. It prioritizes 
sharing responsibility among stakeholders rather than imposing the burden of managing flood 
risk solely on governments and individuals (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Risk sharing, by 
definition, is “the distribution to other parties of some of the burden of loss associated with flood 
risk, and/or the responsibility and costs for measures to avoid, prevent and mitigate flood risk” 
(Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 2017, p. 352). Risk sharing is an important component of FRM as it 
requires that responsibility for mitigation is distributed among all affected parties, ultimately 
allowing for increased stakeholder engagement and more efficient allocation of resources 
(Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Ineffective risk sharing between levels of government and 
between key decision makers has caused a lack of prioritized FRM investment, particularly at a 
local scale.  
FRM incorporates several factors that assert it as a public policy problem. First, it 
identifies that the consequences of flooding are a result of poor decision-making, rather than a 
natural occurrence (Gober & Wheater, 2015; Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). FRM also 
requires a variety of policies for the effective management of flood events. There is a need to 







that there are defined roles for the planning and implementation of FRM measures (Sayers et al., 
2013). Additionally, using risk-based approaches in FRM as opposed to traditional hazard-based 
models require stakeholder involvement and shared responsibility, thereby defining it as public 
policy (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a).  
FRM requires policy strategies and instruments that go beyond traditional ways of 
inputting structural and non-structural defenses (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Sayers et al. 
(2013) identify the foundations of effective FRM policy, which include securing funding and 
support for FRM measures, cooperation among stakeholders and strategies, communication of 
risk, suitable legal framework, as well as the enactment of “adaptive management” programs (p. 
8). Sustainable FRM policy in Canada will actively incorporate each of these elements. 
 2.1.4 FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE 
Within the past ten years, there has been an uptake of FRM in flood policy around the 
world. Managing flood risk is becoming a priority in international climate change strategies 
(Wiering et al., 2017). Both the United Nations and the European Union have identified FRM as 
an effective framework to mitigate flood risk (European Commission, 2016; Henstra, 
Thistlethwaite, et al., 2019; United Nations, 2015). Uptake of FRM governance has been viewed 
in many countries including England, Scotland, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Poland and 
Sweden, India, and China (Hegger et al., 2016; Henstra, Thistlethwaite, et al., 2019; van Doorn-
Hoekveld et al., 2016; Wiering et al., 2017).  
FRM concepts have influenced national flood management strategies in countries 
worldwide. Many countries have seen a shift to “adaptive risk governance”, where responsibility 
is shared among a well-rounded group of stakeholders from public and private sectors (Mees et 







their FRM strategies. The level of FRM diversification varies between countries, and plays an 
important role in determining a country’s capacity to manage flooding (Hegger et al., 2016). The 
literature emphasises that diversity among flood management strategies and the involvement of 
multi-level stakeholders is critical in promoting resilience to flooding (Hegger et al., 2016; 
Henstra, Thistlethwaite, et al., 2019; Wiering et al., 2017). 
The 2007 EU Flood Directive is a development that initiated a widespread shift towards 
FRM uptake in flood management policy. This program provides a framework grounded in FRM 
principles, which governs member states in managing and reducing adverse the adverse effects 
of flooding (European Commission, n.d.). Sitting at 27 member states across Europe, this 
program is notable as it has allowed for nations to adapt principles of FRM within the context of 
their own country to meet the requirements set out in the Directive, and has improved inter-
country collaboration regarding flood management (Adamson, 2018; EU, 2007).  
Studies have tracked the progress of FRM implementation in various countries, including 
England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland. It was seen that England has a well-
established, diverse FRM approach (Hegger et al., 2016; Wiering et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
England involves multi-level governance, and a variety of both public and private actors in its 
strategy (Wiering et al., 2017). Comparatively, the Netherlands, Poland, France and Belgium 
have diversified their FRM approach to some extent, but a large emphasis has been placed on 
certain elements in their FRM strategy (Hegger et al., 2016). The Netherlands and Poland, 
specifically, tend to rely on stakeholders from the public sector, have prioritized structural 
defenses and were reported as having very low diversification in their FRM approaches. France 
and Belgium have partially diversified strategies, but still rely largely on public entities and 







more resilient to flooding through its diverse FRM strategy. Comparatively, the Netherlands, 
Poland, France and Belgium have been working to implement diverse strategies, where defenses 
are prioritized and additional measures are seen as supportive to flood infrastructure (Hegger et 
al., 2016). 
 Additionally, interactions among private and public sectors in managing flooding have 
been widely studied between nations and are important in understanding each country’s approach 
to risk sharing and implementation of FRM principles. In some countries, such as the 
Netherlands, flood mitigation is seen as a “collective good”, whereby it is largely the 
responsibility of governments and public actors (Meijerink & Dicke, 2008, p. 505). 
Comparatively, nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom have employed both 
the private and public sector in their flood management approach, with the government and the 
insurance industry as important actors (Meijerink & Dicke, 2008).  
It is argued that the use of private entities, such as insurers, in flood management 
approaches is largely dependent on a country’s perception of risk and their values (Hofstede, 
1995; Meijerink & Dicke, 2008). These cultural values include solidarity, the extent to which 
members of society feel responsibility towards one another; independence, describing the extent 
to which each individual in society is responsible for their own protection; and predictability, 
that describes the level to which society perceives risk. In cases where there is high solidarity, 
low independence, and high predictability, governments are prioritized in flood management 
with low private sector involvement (Hofstede, 1995).  
FRM prioritizes a shift towards shifting the responsibility towards a variety of 
stakeholders, and for recovering losses through private-public partnerships (Henstra & 







however research on Canada’s response to FRM implementation is just emerging. There remains 
the need for research that examines FRM uptake in practice.  
 2.1.5 FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT IN CANADA 
A. FRM POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION IN CANADA 
Along with many countries around the world, Canada has seen the implementation of 
FRM principles in disaster policy. As previously mentioned, upper levels of government and 
individuals have traditionally been sources of financial relief in recovering costs after a flood 
event through DFAA payments and out-of-pocket repairs to damaged property (Henstra & 
Thistlethwaite, 2017a). There is an expectation, however, that a wide range of stakeholders, 
including municipalities, will begin to play a larger role in managing flood risk. Local 
governments can play a critical role in managing flood risk through the enactment of bylaws to 
regulate land use and zone new developments to areas that are at low risk to flooding (Stevens & 
Hanschka, 2014). However, municipalities are largely unwilling to enforce ‘restrictive’ policies 
that could limit local economic development, and require federal and provincial intervention to 
enforce these regulations (Stevens & Hanschka, 2014).  
Municipalities, which tend to endure the largest losses to infrastructure and local 
economies, rely on income from property taxes and consequently have less economic flexibility 
to address flood damages compared to upper levels of government that are able to generate 
income from various revenue streams (Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 2017). Furthermore, 
municipalities have limited financial means to adopt flood prevention measures in high risk 
regions (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Despite this, studies have shown that flood 
management efforts are most effective when coordinated at a local scale (PBO, 2016). Risk 







municipalities as it aims to distribute recovery efforts as well as efforts to reduce risk 
(Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 2017).  
Just as recently as 2008, the Government of Canada launched the National Disaster 
Mitigation Strategy (NDMS) (Oulahen, 2014). This strategy was developed to promote natural 
disaster mitigation efforts, through risk reduction and prevention, in order to place less of a strain 
on DFAA (Oulahen, 2014; Public Safety Canada, 2008). Mitigation efforts are referred to in this 
strategy as measures that “include all structural and non-structural risk treatments appropriate to 
hazards, and leverage or incorporate new, existing and developing disaster risk reduction 
programs” (Public Safety Canada, 2008, p. 1). Notably, the NDMS prioritizes risk sharing 
among all levels of government. It identifies the importance of implementing mitigation 
measures at a municipal level to reduce risk from natural hazards and funds local mitigation 
initiatives (Public Safety Canada, 2008; Thistlethwaite, Henstra, et al., 2018).  
One of the main principles in the NDMS is the “return on investment” of mitigation 
strategies (Public Safety Canada, 2008, p. 1). To reduce future damage and repair costs 
associated with natural disasters, investment is directed towards improving the resilience of 
infrastructure and properties (Public Safety Canada, 2008). Hence, it is expected that this 
investment will pay off as instances of natural disasters continue to increase. Furthermore, the 
NDMS aligns with an amendment which was implemented to the DFAA that allocated 15% of 
the funds to mitigation measures, thereby improving disaster financial assistance investment 
(Oulahen, 2014; Public Safety Canada, 2011). This is aimed at equipping communities with the 
resources to mitigate damages from hazards, rather than recovering damages to a “pre-disaster 







In 2014, the National Disaster Mitigation Program (NDMP) was implemented and was 
cemented in flood policy through funding of $200 million over the years of 2015 to 2020. It has 
recently been renewed to extend to 2022. This program enacts measures highlighted throughout 
the NDMS, and aims to reduce the overall costs associated with flooding through funding 
mitigation measures as well as enhance collaboration among insurers (Public Safety Canada, 
2015). Other notable national initiatives that align with FRM implementation include the 
establishment of a National Taskforce on Flood Insurance and Relocation at the end of 2020, 
which prioritizes five key elements of residential flood management including (1) flood 
mapping, (2) flood insurance (3) tactical property buyouts and location transfer, and (4) a review 
of current flood management policies, including DFAA and  NDMP (Meckbach, 2021). Changes 
in natural disaster policy have had implications for the distribution of FRM in Canada.  
Insurance itself has become one of the most widely referenced risk-sharing tools. It is 
well-documented that market-based instruments play an important role in recovery after flood 
events (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a; Oulahen, 2014; Thistlethwaite, 2016; Thistlethwaite, 
Henstra, et al., 2018). Canadian FRM policy has identified flood insurance is a key tool for 
recovering losses from flood events and informing policy through the use of flood maps and 
reporting on insured costs (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). 
However, Canadian insurers have traditionally resisted the introduction of flood 
insurance, stating the argument that it would result in ‘adverse selection’; a process by which 
high-risk homeowners are more likely to request insurance coverage than those that are lower 
risk (Botzen & Van Den Bergh, 2008). Furthermore, people tend to perceive themselves at low 
risk to flooding, resulting in a low demand for flood insurance (Oulahen, 2014). The poor uptake 







costs associated with overland flood events (Thistlethwaite, 2016). Additionally, DFAA has 
traditionally negated incentives for property owners to purchase flood insurance as it has 
compensated for losses endured from flood events (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). 
Nevertheless, flood insurance and personal protection measures are moving to the forefront of 
FRM policy as DFAA is becoming increasingly limited (Thistlethwaite, Henstra, et al., 2018). 
Despite support for FRM, its implementation has been slow in Canada. There is a need 
for employing a consistent and sustainable approach towards FRM in Canada, as flooding is no 
longer economically, politically or socially feasible. Resilience and adaptation are important 
concepts in informing effective FRM policies in Canada. An effective flood risk management 
strategy in Canada will incorporate both resilience and adaptation through efforts to reduce the 
impacts of flooding before an event occurs (Folke, 2006). This can include measures such as 
warning systems, evacuation plans, spatial planning, building regulations, as well as retrofitting 
properties to minimize damage due to floods. Embodying resilience in high-risk regions also 
includes flood risk management processes to aid with post-flood damage, which can incorporate 
damage compensation measures and insurance (Vis et al., 2003). Adaptation, comparatively, 
refers to the actions and decision-making process performed to mitigate future socio-ecological 
change without changing the structural identity, function, or feedbacks of the system (Nelson et 
al., 2007). Through improved FRM policy implementation that incorporates these principles, a 








2.2 POLITICAL DISCOURSE, PUBLIC POLICY & FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT 
 2.2.1 DISCOURSE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
The communication of flood risk is important in determining how FRM is perceived by 
the public and, ultimately, how it gets translated in policy outcomes. By definition, discourse 
refers to accounts that allow “those that subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put 
them together into coherent stories or accounts” (Dryzek, 2013, p. 9). In its most basic form, 
discourse shapes a cohesive knowledge base and set of assumptions within a society that form 
the basis for research, discussion and debate (Dryzek, 2013). However, it is argued that the role 
of discourse goes beyond providing a medium through which narratives are communicated and 
understood. Discourse is also critical in defining and systematizing social practices and 
structures (Howarth, 2010; Laclau & Mouffe, 2014).  
 Discourse influences public policy by informing and amplifying dominant social 
paradigms. Legitimization means the societal acceptance of an ideology or custom (Reyes, 
2011). Political power is given to discourse when it legitimizes prevailing ideologies and 
enforces overarching public opinions (Motion & Leitch, 2009). In this way, discourse reflects 
what is important to the public.  
 Further, the frequency at which issues are discussed determines their relevancy in 
decision-making. Put simply, the more that people are exposed to discourse pertaining to certain 
topics or events, the more salient these issues are among the general populace (Bornstein, 1989). 
This is in part due to a phenomenon called routinization, whereby the repeated exposure to 
information allows for its increased recognition among audiences (Herbst et al., 2014). This 







where people are more likely to prefer ideologies to which they have been repeatedly exposed 
(Sheff, 2010, p. 160).  
Policy actors will often promote their stance on issues using narratives that have been 
pre-subscribed by the public in order to gain widespread support (Liu et al., 2019). This is often 
done through framing which, in short, refers to the process by which an audience understands 
information based on how it is displayed (Goffman, 1974). Altering the presentation of an issue 
or an event can have significant impacts in terms of shaping public views, and can ultimately 
have implications for policy outcomes (Chong & Druckman, 2007).  
Framing in public policy discourse involves the strategic use of language in 
communications. According to Silva et al. (2016), discourse analysis literature provides two 
main principles that govern policy narratives: (1) that language represents dominant public 
beliefs and is inherently influenced by the social systems in which it exists, and (2) that discourse 
is “a form of social practice” that relates narratives with overarching social conditions (p. 225). 
In this way, it is assumed that public policy discourse is composed to enforce and appeal to 
societal expectations (Fairclough, 2001; Silva et al., 2016).  
However, that is not to say that discourse frames are fundamentally consistent with a 
single social paradigm. Each frame is built on its own set of assumptions and values. Reframing 
occurs when there is a paradigm shift in an individual or group’s views (Jerneck & Olsson, 
2011). Reframing assumes that people have already subconsciously subscribed to narratives and 
that a highly influential force is required to change these entrenched notions (Jarratt & Mahaffie, 
2009). It is up to decision-makers to appeal to these existing ideologies and attract public 







Subjects of public policy debate are largely “multi-faceted”, in that they can be framed in 
many different ways (Cairney, 2019, p. 156). The use of keywords and political labels in 
discourse has been found to affect public perception. This has been emphasized in studies 
looking at the ways in which the use of keywords has influenced public opinion on various 
topics; such as smoking and human health (i.e. public health vs. health inequalities) (Cairney, 
2019), immigration (i.e. illegal immigrant vs. undocumented worker) (Lakoff & Ferguson, 
2006), and environmental issues (i.e. climate change vs. global warming) (Schuldt et al., 2011). 
In each case, these policy issues are identified under keywords that are associated with a specific 
point of view, or frame, of the topic. Jerneck and Olsson (2011) summarize that this is a result 
of:  
“dynamic interactions between language (words, concepts) and cognition 
(thinking) meaning that words evoke frames; language evokes moral and 
conceptual frames; the negation of a frame evokes the frame; and the evoking of a 
frame reinforces it” (p. 258). 
In other words, the connotation associated with words that are used in discourse has the ability to 
adhere to individual ideologies. In a public policy context, keywords and labels can be used to 
evoke support from and shape perceptions of the general populace.     
 Often, social and justice movements are a driving force of shifts in public opinion. 
Collective Action Frames are frames that emerge and contest existing, dominant frames (Benford 
& Snow, 2000). Collective action frames are viewed as a series of shared ideologies and are 
widely assumed to stem from a leader’s ability to gain support for their position in challenging 
prevailing (and often justice-based) paradigms (Tarrow, 1992). In this sense, it is assumed that a 
leader’s discourse must appeal to a group, whether it is in terms of identity, ability to act, or a 







there is widespread public support for an issue, it is more likely that it will be influential in 
informing public policy.  
A. MEDIA DISCOURSE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
A large portion of the general public relies on media outlets, such as print and broadcast 
news, to provide current and reliable information on events and issues. Inevitably, the media 
influences public opinion and plays a role in defining the issues that are of political importance. 
Through the use of framing, media sources are able to present political matters in ways which 
influence how they are widely understood and recognized among the public. Often in media 
discourse studies, this is referred to as agenda setting, whereby mass media selectively covers 
issues and events to resonate with audiences in ways that prompt political action (Barnes et al., 
2008; McCombs & Guo, 2014).   
Thistlethwaite et al. (2019) summarize that media framing influences policy in two 
distinct ways: (1) through identifying and concentrating the attention of policymakers to 
particular issues, and (2) by framing events to make them ‘newsworthy’, thereby persuading the 
public to see these issues in a certain context. Increased media coverage has been shown to 
advance the priority of certain issues among policymakers, as well as urge decision-makers to 
add items to discourse agendas (M. Jones et al., 2014; Thistlethwaite et al., 2019).  
News media acts as a source through which key stakeholders, such as public interest 
groups, decision-makers, and subject matter experts can connect with the public (Escobar & 
Demeritt, 2014). Effectively, news media can influence the scope of response through crediting 
the policy problem to a definition that is supported by knowledge and expertise, giving more 
political relevance to the issue (Thistlethwaite et al., 2019). However, news coverage has not 







sources often over- or under- report scientific assessments, thereby miscommunicating risk to 
public audiences. Ultimately, this causes a push for ineffective policy targets (Boholm, 2009).  
The perception of risk is another way in which the media influences public policy. The 
urgency and immanency by which news sources frame a flood event will determine the priority 
of addressing this issue in the political sphere (Barnes et al., 2008). Perceived risk is higher for 
an issue that is linked to long-term effects, is associated with climate change, and that affects 
local infrastructure and public safety, and therefore is more likely to enact policy change 
(Thistlethwaite et al., 2019). Despite this, the sensationalism associated with news reporting is 
short term.  
B. POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
As political discourse spans multiple fields of study, namely political studies and 
linguistics, there has been much debate in settling on a single definition (Kampf, 2015). Further, 
this definition is reliant on the scope at which the term ‘political’ is used. More broadly, political 
discourse can be used to define any dialogue among the general public or organizations, such as 
governments and mass media outlets, regarding policy and decision-making (Kampf, 2015; 
Kirvalidze & Samnidze, 2016). However, when referring to institutional political discourse, the 
definition is often specific to politicians and members of parliament (Kirvalidze & Samnidze, 
2016). The term politicians in this case pertains to individuals who are elected and compensated 
for their role in municipal, provincial and federal decision-making processes (Kirvalidze & 
Samnidze, 2016; van Dijk, 1997). Therefore, through an institutional policy theory lens, and for 
the purposes of this research, the definition according to Kirvalidze & Samnidze (2016) will be 
used, whereby political discourse consists of written and spoken dialogues “which take place in 







Discourse research has examined the influences of discourse and public policy on each 
other. Motion and Leitch (2009) associate discourse with organizational identity, as it is the 
channel through which power is distributed within a system and therefore has an effect on 
political actions within the system. Further, public discourse has a legitimization effect, whereby 
sanctioning a public policy confirms a belief system or knowledge base, through vehicles such as 
normalization, authorization, rationalization, moralization and narrativization (Motion & Leitch, 
2009; Vaara et al., 2006). The reputation of a political institution also has a large influence on 
public perception and the trust that is placed upon it (Stromback & Kiousis, 2011).  
In particular, the Canadian system which is to be examined in this study is a democratic 
system. Gastil (1992) identifies that, theoretically, a democratic system should comprise four 
characteristics; that public decisions must be made purposefully and must have reason to be 
supported, that each member within the system must have equal opportunity to engage in the 
decision-making process, that all involved stakeholders and trade-offs of a decision must be 
considered, and that there should be a mutual respect among representatives and their autonomy 
in voicing their political stances. Hager and Hilbig (2020) remark that public opinion acts as a 
“double-edged sword”, whereby decision-makers must respond to issues that are important to the 
public, however, must be careful not to use public opinion as a way to avoid productive 
discourse and heavily debated subjects (p.936).  
Criticisms have been made that elected officials ultimately address audiences in a manner 
that furthers their platform. Obeng (1997) argues that politicians in this sphere will often avoid 
directly addressing issues which are heavily debated among the general public. Rather, they will 
use verbal tactics, such as metaphors, providing evasive or vague answers to questions, or 







language has long been used in political discourse to influence public opinions and push political 
agendas into mainstream public interest (Stewart et al., 2012). The way in which these messages 
resonate with individuals depends on the public’s translation of language into reasoning.  
Political ideology and affiliation are also key drivers of priorities that are discussed at a 
parliamentary level. By definition, political ideology encompasses the political beliefs of an 
individual and determines the extent to which they lean towards conservative or liberal, and 
political affiliation indicates the political party with which an individual typically associates 
themselves (Cruz, 2017). More left-leaning political ideologies tend towards more progressive 
views on environmental-based issues, often rendering individuals who adopt this ideology more 
accepting of sustainable policies than more right-leaning individuals who favour economic 
progression with limited regulatory burden (Harring & Sohlberg, 2017). Right-leaning 
perspectives have a tendency to oppose beliefs regarding climate change management and 
associated environmental risk (Clements, 2012; Davidson & Haan, 2012).  
This has been seen repeatedly throughout the literature through studies on climate 
change, and various aspects of environmental policy (Clements, 2012; Davidson & Haan, 2012; 
Fielding et al., 2012; Jagers et al., 2018; McCright et al., 2016). Generally, these views have 
been seen as a tool for predicting for attitudes towards environmental policy discussions, 
however, have been cautioned that other factors such as individual values, perceptions of equity, 
cultural background as well as education level also play a role in shaping views towards politics 
(Bauer et al., 2017; Jagers et al., 2018). 
Additionally, there is a broader issue of widespread misunderstanding of political and 
scientific dialogue among general public audiences. Sturgis and Allum (2004) remark that a 







public debates about science and hold government to account over the speed and direction of 
public policy” (p. 55). While it is unreasonable to assume that each member of society will have 
a deep understanding of a wide variety of technical subjects, effective communication and 
transparency within the decision-making process is critical in ensuring that individuals are aware 
of and understand the basis of political decisions. Further, Crozier (2007) argues that the ability 
of governments and political actors to enact effective communication through “open 
informational loops” determines the extent to which information will be deemed legitimate (p. 
13). In effect, if subjects of political discourse are inaccessible or widely misunderstood, they 
will enact little public interest or support. Further, this can lead to indecisiveness and conflicting 
opinions on these subjects (Delshad et al., 2010). This is an important consideration in public 
policy regarding natural hazards management. 
 2.2.2 DISCOURSE AND NATURAL HAZARDS MANAGEMENT IN CANADA 
A. PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND FRM IN CANADA 
To understand how FRM is being implemented, existing research has explored the 
discussion of FRM in public discourse. To promote effective FRM policy implementation, it is 
important that stakeholders including governments, insurers and homeowners are aware of flood 
risk. Public discourse plays a large role in shaping perceived risk; those who have higher 
perceived risk are more likely to undertake personal prevention measures and to purchase flood 
insurance (Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006). 
Researchers have emphasized the importance of the media in influencing political 
outcomes and in shaping public opinions (Crow & Lawlor, 2016). News media has received 
attention in Canada and remains an important force in gaining public awareness about flood 







widespread Canadian media outlets often report on events that are likely to influence public 
policy, however, they are likely to omit the policy gaps that contribute to flood events 
(Thistlethwaite et al., 2019).  
News reports of key flooding events have a tendency to focus on an event and the 
immediate impacts, as opposed to the underlying causes, vulnerabilities or effective management 
strategies (Escobar & Demeritt, 2014). Studies have found that flood coverage in the news is 
primarily focused on noteworthy events, with little mention of climate change, policy failures 
that have resulted in severe overland floods, or context regarding the long-term effects of these 
events (Escobar & Demeritt, 2014; Rashid, 2011; Thistlethwaite et al., 2019). Policymakers have 
shown to pay more consideration to issues that are grounded in experience and knowledge from 
relevant stakeholders, thereby demonstrating the importance of reporting credible information in 
flood discourse (Thistlethwaite et al., 2019).  
A lack of awareness is one of the main obstacles facing widespread implementation of 
FRM. Surveyed homeowners have demonstrated a strong sense of responsibility when it comes 
to protecting their properties against flooding. However, only around 30% of residents had 
undertaken substantial property-level flood protection, 23% demonstrated a willingness to pay 
for flood insurance, and an astonishing 6% were aware of their overall flood risk  (Henstra & 
Thistlethwaite, 2019). This signifies an overall absence of understanding of flood risk among the 
public and could ultimately signify a failure of communication of these risks by mass media and 
policymakers.  
Experience has been determined as a key contributing factor to flood risk perception 
among individuals (Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006). Some experts have argued that it is in fact the 







property-level flood protection measures (Thistlethwaite, Henstra, et al., 2018). Studies have 
shown that individuals who have been exposed to flood events demonstrate increased perceived 
risk and more prevention behaviours than those who have not been exposed to flooding (Mills et 
al., 2016; Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006). Individuals rely on media sources when there is a lack of 
personal experience with a phenomenon, such as flooding, further emphasizing news media as a 
key force in driving public discourse pertaining to FRM  (Kasperson et al., 1988).  
B. POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND FRM 
While some research has discussed the influence of media and public discourse on FRM 
in Canada, the role of political discourse remains largely unexplored. As FRM is an evolving 
approach in flood management, its principles have experienced slow implementation in Canadian 
public policy. However, with an emerging flood insurance market and the ability to draw upon 
federal, provincial and territorial resources, Canada has the opportunity to spearhead a national 
flood management system which incorporates principles of FRM (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 
2017b).  
Generally, FRM decision-making comprises of six primary steps as summarized by 
Maskrey et al. (2016), including;  
“a) problem definition; b) objective setting; c) benchmark development and setting; d) 
intervention option scoping and definition; e) intervention option appraisal and; f) 
intervention option recommendation/selection” (p. 276).  
Studies that have taken place internationally have demonstrated the importance of early 
stakeholder participation in the decision-making process to warrant accountability in FRM 
implementation (Kuhlicke et al., 2016). Research has also identified the need for tools such as 
flood risk maps, flood insurance and flood risk reporting to improve the uptake of FRM 







 Despite its widespread acceptance among flood management literature, political 
discourse pertaining to FRM in Canada has yet to be investigated. As flood risk in Canada is 
undeniably increasing, the literature points towards a need for a risk-based approach to managing 
floods that aim to mitigate flood risk, rather than relying on traditional hazards-based approaches 
that prioritize flood prediction and prevention. This includes employing a wide-ranging variety 
of tools and stakeholders to diversify flood risk in Canada. The employment of effective FRM 
principles in flood management policy begins with proactive discourse among key decision-
makers in Canada. As such, this research aims to determine the extent to which FRM is being 























3.1 DATA COLLECTION 
The focus of this research is political discourse regarding FRM in Canada, and whether 
flooding is being prioritized as a policy problem. Specifically, this research pertains to the 
discussion of FRM among policymakers. For the scope of this study, discourse was derived from 
the publicly accessible Canadian Hansard Index of Debates, through the Parliament of Canada’s 
House of Commons Database. The Hansard Index is a “verbatim account of what is said in 
Parliament” (McGill Library, n.d.). These accounts contain official dialogue among the 338 
Members of Provincial Parliament, defined as “the elected assembly of the Parliament of 
Canada. Its members are elected by Canadians to represent defined electoral districts of 
constituencies, also known as ridings” (House of Commons, n.d.).  
A keyword search of the database for the term “flood”, and its variants, such as 
“flooding” or “floods”, yielded 204 unique documents between the years of 2006 to 2020. The 
sample spans 15 years and includes dialogue from the 39th Parliament, 1st session through to the 
43rd Parliament, 2nd session. Each unique document represents one parliamentary session date. 
Each of these documents was downloaded as a .PDF file and is labelled by date and Hansard 
Number in preparation for temporal analysis. 
A sample of 25 files were manually searched for the key word “flood”. This was done as 
a quality check to ensure that the word “flood” was used in the context of a natural hazard. The 
204 Hansard documents are then uploaded onto the NVivo Qualitative Data Analysis Software.  
A Text Search Query was then performed on the Hansard documents for the words 







“floods” and “flooding”. The results yielded 197 unique Hansard files, and 1502 references. 
Duplicates among the three Text Search Queries were removed.  
 
3.2 CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Throughout this study, a content analysis was used to explore connections between 
political discourse on floods and FRM framing. Content analysis is a method which has been 
used widely to examine discourse surrounding natural disaster policy and management (Houston 
et al., 2012; Shi, 2020; Tang et al., 2013; Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 2017). It explores the 
predominant frames and themes within a set of written dialogues by determining the connotation 
of keywords based on a set of predetermined indicators (Downe‐Wamboldt, 1992; Saraisky, 
2016). Specific to this research, content analysis gives insight into flood risk frames within 
Canada’s federal government through determining the presence or absence of variables that 
indicate effective FRM dialogue.  
For this research, manual coding was used, as opposed to automated or computer-assisted 
coding strategies. This was done for several reasons, including reliability, familiarity, and 
objectivity (de Graaf & van der Vossen, 2013; Thistlethwaite et al., 2019). As dialogue within 
the Hansard varies largely between speakers and parliamentary sessions, manual coding allows 
for an in-depth analysis of each reference to ensure consistency within the coding process. 
Additionally, it accommodates the complexity of the codebook, which contains multiple nested 
sub nodes as well as nodes with open code. It also helps to evaluate the inclusion of a reference 
in the sample. Several references have been manually excluded as the discourse does not meet 








3.3 CODEBOOK DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION 
A codebook was designed to determine how flood risk is being framed within the 
Hansard, and whether parliamentary discussions among members of Canada’s Federal 
Government are conducive to effective risk governance. According to the literature review, there 
are several elements that identify effective FRM discourse, including the identification a broad 
range of stakeholders; accountability for flood risk among all levels of government and sectoral 
actors; the assertation that flooding is a policy problem; and the implementation of a diverse set 
of tangible commitments and tools to reduce overall flood risk (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a; 
Sayers et al., 2013; Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 2017). To capture these fields in the codebook, a 
framework was established that identifies six distinct categories, including: (1) Flood 
Identification, (2) Party Speaking on Flooding, (3) Problem Framing, (4) Climate Change 
Framing (5) Flood Risk Management Focus, and (6) Stakeholder Identification. Once the 
overarching categories were developed, a codebook to disseminate these themes was constructed 
in NVivo using parent- and sub-nodes.  
 3.3.1 DISCOURSE SELECTION 
To capture discourse on flooding and framing around FRM in policy discourse, 
discussions that center around flooding and that reference flood as a natural disaster in Canada 
were coded. There are several cases where the references did not meet this criterion, and as a 
result have been excluded from the sample.  
The first instance where this criterion was not met is dialogue where floods are identified 
as human-induced. This includes circumstances where water levels have been intentionally 
increased, regions have been purposely flooded, structures such as dams have been built that 







waters1,2. The second instance where these requirements were not been met is when the word 
“flood” is not used in relation to a natural hazard event, and instead has been used as a figure of 
speech3,4. These references were not coded. Additionally, this research has a specific focus on 
flood policy in Canada. References which discuss international flood events were removed from 
the selection5.  
Discussions which are not specific to flooding were also removed from this analysis as 
they do not provide substantial insight on FRM or flood framing and would in turn bias the final 
coding results. There are several cases where these references have been removed. The first is 
 
1 Sample quote: “Mr. Speaker, intentional flooding in the spring of 2011 forced Manitoba first nations from 
their homes. A year and a half, and millions of dollars later, more than 2,000 people are still in Winnipeg 
hotels” (Bennett, 2012, p. 11915) 
2 Sample quote: “Plan 2014, for the benefit of Canadians who have not heard of it, is the policy of the 
federal government to create 26,000 hectares, or 64,000 acres, of wetland by flooding homeowners in the 
Lake Ontario-St. Lawrence water basin, which includes the Ottawa River watershed. What happens when 
homeowners who are being adversely affected by catastrophic flooding dare to question the Liberal policy 
to flood their homes?” (Gallant, 2020, p. 1788) 
3 Sample quote: “Spam is not just a Canadian problem, as I indicated earlier. Given the borderless nature 
of the Internet, it means that spam can originate from anywhere and be delivered anywhere. It will not help 
a lot if we just do the controls here because then we will be flooded by people sending spam to Canadians, 
gumming up Canadian businesses” (Bagnell, 2010, p. 4437) 
4 Sample quote: “In addition, we are taking real action to strengthen our borders. These borders are 
strengthened to stem the flood of illegally smuggled firearms from the United States. Our efforts to crack 
down on this illegal activity have taken many forms, including the deployment of integrated border 
enforcement teams at strategic points along the border, as well as making key improvements to border 
infrastructure, which improves the way that travellers are screened” (Yelich, 2011, p. 2784) 
5 Sample quote: “Mr. Speaker, Fiji has just experienced massive floods that have caused millions of dollars 
in damage, displaced thousands of families, and killed several people. All across Canada, Fijian families 
are concerned that the government has not reacted with any urgency. Canada has pledged no form of support 











with regards to discussions on climate change6. References that mention flooding as an example 
of climate change but are not related to FRM, or that do not discuss flooding beyond using it as 
example have been removed from the selection. Other examples include where flooding has been 
briefly mentioned but is not the focus of discussion7. Also excluded were statements of 
expressed sentiment, whereby the speaker gives brief condolences to communities that have 
endured flooding prior to initiating a debate.  
Finally, references of “flood” in the Routine Proceedings section of the Hansard 
documents are not conducive to analysis of parliamentary discussions on flooding and FRM. 
This section contains statements from Members of Parliament to bring attention to a variety of 
issues. However, this section is “generally without debate”, and the issues are discussed at a later 
date (Bosc & Gagnon, 2017b). Since it only contains open-ended questions and does not involve 
any discussion among politicians, its references were also omitted from the selection. Based on 
these criteria, the coded discourse involves a total a sample size of 236 unique references of 
“flood” throughout 149 Hansard documents.  
 
 
6 Sample quote: “The reality is the world is getting hotter. The warmest 13 years of average global 
temperatures have all occurred in the 15 years since 1997. Increased global average temperatures are 
expected to increase droughts and floods, and other extreme weather patterns. Recent record-breaking 
temperatures for June 2012 are what we would expect from climate change. In fact, records for the 
contiguous United States that have been kept since 1895 show that July 2012 was the hottest month ever” 
(Duncan, 2013, p. 15886) 
 
7 Sample quote: “Up to 273 RCMP personnel were involved in an operation that resulted in officers kicking 
in doors at more than 1,900 homes in High River, Alberta, between June 21 and July 7, 2013. Thirty Alberta 
communities were flooded in June 2013 and some were evacuated, but it was only in High River, Alberta, 








 3.3.2 CODE DESCRIPTIONS 
Flood Identification determines whether specific floods are being discussed. This also 
identifies which regions of Canada are being prioritized among flood discourse within the 
Hansard. Further analysis of this category also gives a better understanding of whether the 
discussion is event-based, whereby it was prompted in response to a major flood in a specific 
location. Evidence of events-based discourse that is predominantly initiated by the occurrence of 
flood events demonstrates a lack of discussion surrounding key elements of FRM, such as 
preparedness and mitigation.  
Table 1: Nodes and code description for the Flood Identification category, whereby 1 indicates the presence of 
the respective variable, and 0 indicates its absence. 
Parent Node Sub Nodes Code Description 
Province or 
Territory 
ON, AB, MB, SK, 
BC, QC, NS, NB, PEI, 
NL, NU, NWT, YK, 0 
The mention of a province or territory was coded at the 
corresponding sub node. A reference could be coded at more 
than one sub node if the discussion referenced multiple 
provinces or territories.  
 
If no province or territory was discussed, then the reference 
was coded at 0. 
City 1 [Open Code] Captured (1) if a specific city was identified in the reference. 
Open code was used, however if a sub node already existed 
for the respective city, then it was captured under the existing 
sub node. 
0 
Reference to a 
Specific Flood 
1 Captured (1) if a specific flood event is identified in the 
reference. 0 
 
Party Speaking on Flooding determines who is prompting the discussion on flooding. 
This includes whether the speaker is a member of opposition or cabinet, and the Canadian 
political party in which the speaker belongs. Overall, this gives insight into whether political 
parties tend towards specific flood frames, which parties speak the most on flood risk, and 
whether the discourse has evolved through changes of government within the House of 







framing of environmental issues, such as flooding, as it is expected that left-wing parties are 
more likely to support environmental- and climate-related policy efforts compared to their right-
wing counterparts (Jagers et al., 2018).  
Table 2: Nodes and code description for the Party Speaking on Flooding category, whereby 1 indicates the 
presence of the respective variable, and 0 indicates its absence. 
Parent Node Sub Nodes Code Description 
Political Party Conservative Party of Canada 
[CPC] 
The political party to which the speaker belongs. 
In the case where there is a discussion among 
speakers from multiple political parties, the party 
of the speaker that initiated the discussion on 
flooding is coded. 
Liberal Party of Canada [LIB] 
New Democratic Party [NDP] 
Green Party [GRP] 




1 Captured (1) if the speaker is a member of the 
Official Opposition party.  0 
Member of 
Cabinet 
1 Captured (1) if the speaker is a Member of 
Cabinet. This includes the Prime Minster, 




Problem Framing examines variables relating to the context in which flood risk is 
perceived in Canadian political discourse. This highlighted elements that distinguish discourse as 
proactive to FRM implementation, such as whether flood risk is presented as increasing, urgent, 
manageable, or preventable, natural or anthropogenic, and whether an explicit policy problem or 
failure is identified. Additionally, the consequences of flood risk framing have been captured, 
including social, political/partisan, and economic, as well as the temporal aspects of the 
discussion. Further analysis of these variables determines whether these elements are actively 
being discussed, as well as how dialogue around these variables evolved over time.  
Urgency within policy discourse establishes flood management as a priority and allows 
for improved implementation of risk-minimizing measures, particularly within high-risk flood 







among decision-makers that instances of flood are rising, that climate change and poor policy 
decisions contribute to flood risk, that the consequences of flooding are surpassing an acceptable 
threshold, and that there is a need to implement sustainable flood management practices. Further, 
framing flooding as manageable and preventable, as well as human-induced and as a product of 
poor policy, ascertains that overall flood risk can be minimized through effective governance and 
mitigation. The recognition of each of these factors within parliamentary discourse allows for 
discussions to take place which are conducive to FRM. 
It is also important to identify the temporal aspects in which flooding is framed 
throughout policy discourse. Addressing the long-term and short-term consequences of flooding 
are important in effective FRM discourse, however a tendency to focus predominantly on the 
short-term effects can demonstrate a lack of importance placed on mitigating the long-term 
effects of flooding. In addition, framing flooding as both a present and a future risk aligns with 
FRM, but a dominant focus on short-term framing can show a lack of awareness of flood risk as 
increasing. Conversely, a dominant focus on long-term framing can demonstrate a lack of 
understanding of flood risk as urgent. Therefore, each of these temporal frames should be 














Table 3: Nodes and code description for the Problem Framing category, whereby 1 indicates the presence of 
the respective variable, and 0 indicates its absence. 
Parent Node Sub Nodes Code Description 
Flood Risk as 
Increasing 
1 Captured (1) if flood risk is framed as likely to recur and 
surge in severity or frequency. 0 
Flood Risk as 
Manageable or 
Preventable 
1 Captured (1) if flood risk is framed as a predictable 
occurrence whereby risk can be reduced by 
implementing effective FRM measures (i.e., 
preparedness, mitigation/prevention, response, 
recovery). 
0 
Flood Risk as 
Urgent 
1 Captured (1) if it is stated that prompt action from 
governing entities is required to minimize flood risk. 0 
Flood Risk as 
Natural or 
Anthropogenic 
Natural [N] Act of God Captured at N if the cause of flooding is a natural 
occurrence and separate from human influence. Sub 
nodes of N include, (a) Act of God, whereby floods were 
framed as an unpredictable and uncontrollable 
phenomenon, and (b) Geophysical, whereby floods stem 
from naturally occurring phenomena such as spring 
snow melt, heavy rainfall, etc.  
 
A reference is captured at A if flooding is linked to a 
human-induced policy problem, such as climate change, 
failed infrastructure, etc.  
 





or Failure Stated 
1 Captured (1) if there is an explicit criticism of policy or 
it is stated that there is a lack of action on behalf of the 




Short Term [S] Captured at S if the consequences of flooding are framed 
as immediate and solvable.  
 
Captured at L if the consequences of flooding are framed 
as multi-faceted and complex with effects that will be 
seen for an extended period. 
Long Term [L] 
Temporal Scale 
of Discussion 
Present [P] Captured at P if the discussion is in present tense and is 
centered around current flood risk.  
 
Captured at F if the discussion is in future tense and is 
centered around future flood risk.   
Future [F] 
Consequences 
of Flood  
Political-
Partisan 
1 Captured (1) if flooding results in a critique of 
governance structures; examples include the enactment 
or modification to a government policy or program, 









0 Captured (1) if consequences of flooding are framed as 
monetary; examples include damage to public and 
personal property, loss of business, etc.   
Social 1 Captured (1) if consequences of flooding are framed as 
impacting social wellbeing; examples include health 




Climate Change Framing determines linkages between flood risk and climate change 
throughout the discourse.  This will determine whether floods tend to be framed as isolated 
events, or whether they are discussed in connection to the broader policy problem of climate 
change. The classification of temporal framing (i.e., present vs. future) highlights whether 
politicians present climate change as relevant to current FRM implementation and requires 
immediate action, or a future issue that will require action. Further analysis of these variables 
also determined how this frame changes between 2006 and 2020.  
Table 4: Nodes and code description for the Climate Change Framing category, whereby 1 indicates the 
presence of the respective variable, and 0 indicates its absence. 
Parent Node Sub Nodes Code Description 
Climate Change 
Stated as a 
Contributing 
Factor 
1 Present [P] Captured (1) if climate change is stated as a cause or 
accelerator of flood risk. 
 
Sub nodes include (a) P, whereby climate change is 
stated as currently propagating flood risk, and (b) F, 





Flood Risk Management Focus identifies the specific elements of FRM that are being 
considered among Canadian politicians. This includes the four key constituents of FRM, 
including (1) Preparedness, (2) Mitigation/Prevention, (3) Response, and (4) Recovery. Effective 
FRM discourse highlights each of these four elements. Additionally, this category capture 







aspects of FRM are being discussed, the prominent aspects of FRM that are being discussed, as 
well as the degree to which measures were being undertaken to reduce overall risk of flooding 
across Canada. Further analysis of these variables gives insight as to which political parties tend 
to favour certain aspects of FRM in discussion, as well as how discourse around FRM 
implementation has changed over the 15-year period studied.  
Table 5: Nodes and code description for the Flood Risk Management Focus category, whereby 1 indicates the 
presence of the respective variable, and 0 indicates its absence.  
Parent Node Sub Nodes Code Description 




Captured at PREP if the discussion involves the readiness of 
emergency measures prior to a flood occurring. This includes tools 
such as warning systems, evacuation plans, community education 
campaigns, as well as composing emergency response plans. 
 
Captured at MIT if the discussion revolves around action that is 
undertaken before a flood occurs to minimize overall risk. This 
includes mitigative and preventative measures such as structural 
defenses, infrastructure reinforcement, and funding adaptation 
programs.  
 
Captured at RES if the discussion pertains to emergency measures 
undertaken during a flood event to reduce the amount of damage 
suffered. This includes the involvement of emergency response 
teams, sandbagging, emergency evacuation, etc. 
 
Captured at REC if the reference discusses measures undertaken to 
minimize losses after a flood event and compensate for damages 
that are incurred. This includes measures such as post-flood 
financing programs, rebuilding, and flood insurance. 
 
Coded at 0 if there is no reference to the four identified elements 
of FRM. If there was more than one element of FRM stated in a 





Explicit Action to 
Reduce Flood 
Risk 
1 Captured (1) if tangible commitments are expressed to reduce 
overall flood risk. This includes mitigation and preparedness 
programs, stakeholder consultation, strengthening infrastructure, 
etc.  
0 







The final category, Stakeholder Identification, captures the actors that are identified in 
parliamentary discourse on flooding. This includes any mentioned stakeholders, whether this 
stakeholder is portrayed in a negative (critical) or positive (constructive) context, as well as the 
role that the stakeholder plays in the discussion. This also includes the levels of government 
(municipal, provincial, or federal) that are involved in sharing flood risk. Specific government 
entities, such as ministries or government organizations, as well as government programs and 
policies that are identified within the discussion are coded. Indigenous communities and their 
linkage to flooding are also coded to examine discussions surrounding vulnerable populations, as 
well as whether this linkage has a positive (beneficial) or negative (deleterious) connotation.  
This category determines the diversity of stakeholders involved in managing flood risk, 
which levels of Canadian government are often cited as responsible for flooding, as well as the 
governing entities which are perceived as having the most accountability for flood risk. Evidence 
of a diverse stakeholder engagement aligns with the principles of FRM, as it facilitates risk 
sharing, and allows for improved coordination among involved parties before, during and after a 
flood event occurs. Further, it allows for increased accountability among governing actors by 
specifying roles in flood management for stakeholders.   
Table 6: Nodes and code description for the Stakeholder Identification category, whereby 1 indicates the 
presence of the respective variable, and 0 indicates its absence. 




1 Stakeholder Listed 
[Open Code] [P, N] 
Captured (1) if a specific stakeholder is 
identified in the discussion.  
 
The first sub node captures the identified 
stakeholder. Open code is used, however if a 
node already exists for the respective 
stakeholder, then it is captured under the 
existing node. For each stakeholder, a second 












0 stakeholder was being framed with a positive 
connotation. For discussions where the 
stakeholder is framed negatively or criticized, 
it is coded under the second sub node of N. 
 
The stakeholder role or function is identified 
as a sub node. It is captured (1) using open 
code, however if a node already exists for the 
respective stakeholder role or function, then it 
is captured under the existing node. See Table 






Share Flood Risk 
1 Federal [FED] Captured (1) at the respective level of 
government if it is identified in the discussion 
as responsible for an aspect of reducing flood 
risk.  
 
If there was more than one level of 
government identified in a reference, then it 









1 Government Program 
or Policy [Open Code] 
[P, N] 
Captured (1) if a government program or 
policy is identified. Open code is used, 
however if a node already exists for the 
respective program or policy, then it is 
captured under the existing node.  
 
For each program or policy, a second sub node 
of P is used for discussions where the program 
was being framed with a positive connotation. 
For discussions where the program is framed 
negatively or criticized, it is coded under the 






1 Open Code Captured (1) if a Ministry or government 
organization is identified in the discussion. 
Open code is used, however if a node already 
exists for the respective Ministry or 
government organization, then it is captured 




1 Positive [P] Captured (1) if the discussion mentions 










Negative [N]  
The discussion is coded at a sub node of P if 
Indigenous communities are positively linked 
with flooding. This includes Indigenous 
involvement in risk reduction measures, 
emergency management plans, community 
consultation, etc. 
 
The discussion is coded at a sub node of N if 
Indigenous communities are negatively 
impacted by flooding. This includes instances 
of repeated relocation, losses endured by 
Indigenous communities due to flooding, etc. 
0 
 
 Stakeholder roles were classified based on the descriptions in Table 7, in order to 
categorize the most commonly cited functions assigned to the stakeholders. Defining each role 
allowed for improved categorization of the function of involved parties, which enabled further 
analysis on the diversification of stakeholder roles in policy discourse and the extent to which the 
elements of FRM (i.e., preparedness, mitigation, response, recovery) were highlighted through 
these roles.  
Table 7: Coding description for Stakeholder Role/Function sub node. 
Stakeholder Role Description 
Climate Action Put in place mitigation and adaptation strategies to address climate change. 
Community Outreach Initiatives to involve local communities in decision-making and inform 
individuals on flood risk and flood preparation; examples include education 
campaigns, community engagement sessions, etc. 
Develop a National 
Flood Plan 
Involved in the development of a consistent National Flood Plan for Canada. 
Ecological Infrastructure 
Restoration 
Protect and restore natural habitats with the objective of using them as 
structural defenses to flooding; examples include wetlands, tree planting, etc. 
Emergency Preparedness Undertake measures to improve readiness prior to a flood event. 
Emergency Response Front-line involvement in coordinating rescue and response efforts during a 
flood event.  
Evacuation Involvement in evacuation as an emergency response measure during a flood 
event. 




Involvement in the implementation or maintenance of flood defense structures 







Flood Insurance Involvement in the discussion on implementing a flood insurance system in 
Canada. 
Flood Mapping Implement and/or improve flood risk mapping systems. 
Flood Plain and 
Watershed Management 
Involvement in managing regions containing natural water basins that are at 
high risk of flooding. 
Funding for Emergency 
Response Volunteer 
Organizations 
Provide funding for emergency response organizations, such as the Red Cross. 
Funding Risk Reduction 
Programs 
Provide funding to programs targeted at reducing flood risk; examples include 
funding the construction of structural defenses, infrastructure reinforcement, 
programs such as the Disaster Mitigation and Adaptation Fund, etc. 
Indigenous Relations Work with Indigenous communities to reduce flood risk as well as improve 
flood preparation and response. 
Infrastructure 
Reinforcement 
Improve the resilience of existing infrastructure so that it can withstand a flood 
event. This includes reinforcing public infrastructures such as bridges, 
roadways, sewer systems, etc. 
Land Use and Zoning Enact regulations prevent or limit development in high-risk flood zones. 
Policy Reformation Examine and enact alterations to existing government programs or policies to 
better accommodate flood management. 
Property Buyouts Involved in the process of purchasing properties in high-risk flood zones to 
minimize exposure to floods. 
Rebuilding Finance and/or coordinate the restoration of damaged property and 
infrastructure after a flood event. 
Relocation Involved in the process of relocating individuals or communities out of high-
risk flood zones. 
Research and 
Development 
Conduct research pertaining to flood risk and mitigation or translate external 
research into policy. 
Satellite Weather 
Forecasting and Warning 




Implement communications infrastructure, such as cell phone towers for 
emergency response purposes. 
Water Level 
Management 
Monitor and/or take action to reduce water levels to prevent and prepare for 
flooding. 
 
3.4 DATA EXPORT 
Once all references were coded, the Codebook was directly exported to an excel 
document (Appendix A). This was used as a summary document and informs the descriptive 
results. For an export containing more detailed results, and to prepare the data for the problem 







retrieve node-specific results. The report was then exported to Microsoft Excel where it has been 
cleansed and formatted for further analysis. 
 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
 3.5.1 INITIAL RESULTS 
Using the summary codebook (Appendix A), preliminary graphs and the percentages of 
each sub node were produced. This allows for a direct comparison of corresponding sub nodes 
within each category. It was also used to draw initial conclusions on the geographical and 
temporal aspects of flood in policy discourse, flood policy problems and actions, the framing of 
flood risk, the relation between Indigenous communities and flooding, as well as climate change 
and flood risk.  
Comparison graphs were produced using node-specific results. The compilation of this 
data sorts the codes that are specific to each reference. This allows for the analysis of trends by 
date as well as political party. These results have provided the basis for further statistical 
analysis. 
 3.5.2 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
A statistical analysis was then performed to determine whether there were any significant 
relationships between political party, ideology, and flood risk framing. The variables chosen for 
this analysis included those that determined how flood risk was framed in accordance with FRM. 
These include, (1) flood risk as increasing, (2) flood risk as manageable or preventable, (3) flood 
risk as urgent, (4) flood risk as natural or anthropogenic, (5) climate change stated as a 
contributing factor to flood risk, (6) policy problem or failure stated, (7) long- or short-term 







reduce flood risk. The node-specific results were used to convert for these variables into binary 
(1, 0) results, which were then sorted by Hansard file and political party of the member of 
parliament speaking. 
Statistical tests were then conducted, including chi-square to determine the significance 
of the relationships between flood framing variables and political party, as well as a Cramer’s V 
test. Throughout the sample, the discourse was dominated by three main political parties 
including the Liberal Party of Canada, the Conservative Party of Canada, and the New 
Democratic Party. The sample size for the Green Party, the Bloc Québécois, and Independent 
Parties were too small derive reliable results, and consequently references from these parties 
were removed to focus on the prevailing flood risk frames. Once exported, these results were 
























4. RESULTS & DISCUSSION: 
This section outlines the primary findings of this research, which examines the 
predominant frames by which flooding is discussed among politicians within the Canadian 
political sphere. This includes the examination of narratives pertaining to the geographic and 
temporal frames in flood discourse, flood policy problems and actions, the framing of flood risk, 
indigenous communities and flood risk, climate change and flood framing, political parties and 
ideology and flood risk frames, as well as government stakeholders and flood risk.  
4.1 GEOGRAPHIC AND TEMPORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FLOODING IN 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
 4.1.1 LOCATION AND REPRESENTATION 
Geographic and temporal aspects identified within flood policy discourse provide insight 
into the prioritization and the factors which prompt discussion on flooding. Based on the 
frequency by which each province is identified within the literature (Figure 1), it is evident that 
Quebec and Ontario are most referenced in flood discussion with each cited 70 and 57 times, 
respectively. New Brunswick, Manitoba, British Columbia, and Alberta are cited less frequently, 








Figure 1: The number of flood references by province in the discourse sample studied from the Canadian 
Hansard Index. 
 
Representation within the House of Commons varies among provinces, and is dependent 
on population of each province, as well as policies including the “Grandfather Clause”, which 
states that no province could have less seats than was allocated in 1986 through the 
Representation Act, a “Senatorial Clause”, which dictates that a province cannot possess fewer 
seats in the House of Commons than in the Senate, and the “Representation Rule”, which adjusts 
for over- or under- representation within the House (Bosc & Gagnon, 2017a). Currently, there 
are 388 seats in the House of Commons, with the greatest number of seats held by Ontario (121), 
and Quebec (78), followed by British Columbia (42), Alberta (34), Saskatchewan (14), and 
Manitoba (14), Nova Scotia (11), and New Brunswick (10) (Elections Canada, 2020).  
Upon comparison of the number of references by province and provincial seat 
representation within the House of Commons, it is evident that Ontario and Quebec hold the 

































representation and flood mentions, including Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and New 
Brunswick. These results suggest that provincial seat representation within the House is a 
contributing factor to the provinces most frequently cited in flood discourse within the Hansard.  
There are other potential influences to consider when examining flood mention by 
province within the Hansard, such as flood cost and frequency. The Parliamentary Budget Office 
reports that between 2005 and 2014, the most DFAA payouts have gone to Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta, comprising 82% of DFAA expenditures on natural disasters (Figure 
2). Flooding comprises the majority of these costs (PBO, 2016). Upon examination of the large-
scale flood events (with costs greater than or equal to $50 000 000) in Canada between 2006 and 
2020, these have occurred the most in Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and 
New Brunswick, respectively (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2: The number of flood references by province in the discourse sample studied from the Canadian 
Hansard Index compared with the amount of DFAA spending by province between the years of 2005 to 2014.  
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Figure 3: The number of flood references by province in the discourse sample studied from the Canadian 
Hansard Index compared with the number of large-scale flood events in Canada, where the cost was equal to or 
greater than $50 000 000 CAD.  
(Sources: Contant, 2018; Cousins, 2021; Golnaraghi et al., 2020; Government of Canada, 2018; IBC, 2018, 
2019a, 2019b, 2021; Malik, 2021) 
 
As evidenced by Figures 2 and 3, there is a relation between the frequency and severity 
of flood events and the number of flood references by province in the Hansard. Alberta, 
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan are highlighted as receiving the largest proportion of DFAA 
payouts, however, do not yield the largest number of references within the sample. With Ontario 
and Quebec experiencing the highest frequency of large-scale flood events, it is expected that 
these provinces will be prioritized in discussion. This is the case, however this is not true for 
Alberta and Saskatchewan, where moderately frequent flood events are still occurring. 
While the frequency and severity of flood events does seem to capture attention among 







force that influences the degree to which each province is highlighted among discussion. This 
demonstrates that politics, rather than flood risk, is the impetus of flood discourse. This is not 
consistent with effective FRM strategies, which uses risk-based metrics, such as exposure and 
vulnerability, to implement effective flood policy.  
The interplay between hazards and politics is further examined through the identification 
of specific flood events in discourse. It was determined that 64.8% of references in the sample 
cite a specific flood event. This is indicative of events-based discourse, whereby discussion is 
prompted by or is in relation to a past or present flood event. By contrast, hazards-based 
discourse focuses on flood risk and is not prompted because of a flood event, but rather in the 
interest of reducing overall risk. A hazards-based discussion represents an important shift to 
FRM and incorporates management efforts pre-flood, including preparedness, prevention, and 
mitigation. 
 4.1.2 TEMPORAL ASPECTS OF FLOOD IDENTIFICATION 
An examination of the temporal aspects of political flood discourse was undertaken using 
two metrics: (1) the framing of flood consequences, which determines whether the consequences 
are framed as short term or long term, as well as (2) the scale at which flood risk is described, 
either as a present or future threat. The initial results indicate that the consequences of flood risk 
are more often framed as short term (52.5%) rather than long term (47.5%); however, this 
difference is too small to draw substantial conclusions regarding flood policy framing. 
Contrastingly, upon comparison of the temporal scale of discussion, there is a sizeable difference 
between the framing of flood risk as future or present, with 81.8% of the sample references 







A statistical analysis determined that there was no significant link between political party and the 
temporal framing of flood risk.  
These results emphasize a focus on the present, short-term effects of flooding, rather than 
the future costs. Often, future-scale discussions can be more significant as flood risk is 
recognized prior to an occurrence, and highlights a hazards-based response to flooding, rather 
than an events-based response. A focus on the long-term effects of flooding provides more 
robust discussion around resilience and adaptation, and takes into consideration the lasting 
effects on health care services, mental health, critical infrastructure, displacement, workplaces, 
rebuilding, etc.  
Despite this, a temporal analysis of consequence framing reveals that there is an increase 
in the long-term framing of the consequences of flooding starting in 2016 (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: The number of flood references within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard Index that 



































This could be attributed to a variety of factors including major political implementations, 
such as the Paris Agreement which was put into action in November of 2016, and a shift in 
majority government from the Conservative Party of Canada to the Liberal Party at the end of 
2015 (UNFCCC, n.d.). Further, a statistical analysis performed indicates a significant 
relationship between political party and the framing of consequences (p= 0.01, Cramer’s V= 
0.201). The Chi-Square residuals indicate that Conservatives tend away from framing the costs 
of flooding as long-term. Despite recent developments in consequence framing, the results still 
demonstrate the need to account for socio-economic vulnerability, particularly among 
populations that are likely to be affected by the long-term risk.  
 
4.2 POLITICAL PARTY, IDEOLOGY AND FLOOD RISK 
An initial examination of the results reveals that flood discourse is largely dominated by 
the three main parties, with LIB accounting for 41.5% of the references, CPC accounting for 
22.9%, and NDP accounting for 27.5%. This shows that the LIB Party initiates the majority of 
discussions on flooding, despite being a member of the official opposition for the majority of the 
study period (2006-2015). Additionally, the results reveal that only 8.5% of flood discourse is 
initiated by a Member of Cabinet, and only 16.1% are initiated by a Member of Opposition.  
In Canadian parliament, the Members of Cabinet are comprised of the Ministers that head 
their respective Ministries, which focus on the strategic priorities of the elected administration 
(Government of Canada, n.d.). This indicates that discussions on floods are largely instigated by 
Members of Parliament (91.5%), who represent their respective constituencies across Canada. 
This suggests that flood discussions are rarely initiated at a national level. Rather, localized 







events-based and is in response to occurrences at a local level, including a flooding event that 
has taken place, anticipation of a flood event, or local actions that are targeted at reducing flood 
risk. Further, Members of Parliament that make up the official opposition are not widely 
initiating flood discourse. Consequently, flood management decisions and associated policy 
problems are not being challenged by members of the official opposition.  
Generally speaking, Canada has five principal political parties. These include the Liberal 
Party of Canada, the Conservative Party of Canada, the New Democratic Party, the Bloc 
Québécois, and the Green Party of Canada. These are the parties that typically comprise the main 
sources of parliamentary discussion within the Hansard. Occasionally, an Independent Party 
(IND) has spoken on flooding. This study, however, only captured Table 8 describes the 
overarching ideologies of these parties. 
Table 8: General ideologies of the three principal Canadian political parties examined within this study, where 
CPC is the Conservative Party of Canada, LIB is the Liberal Party of Canada and NDP is the New Democratic 







CPC Right Supports traditional values; generally, prioritizes low taxes, 
less regulatory burden, environmental platforms typically 
focus on technological development and energy efficiency 
(traditionally strong opponent of a tax on carbon, instead 
propose carbon capture and storage to reduce emissions and 
meet targets) 
LIB Centre-Left Supports progressive values; generally, prioritizes social and 
health programs, supports a free market with limited 
regulatory burden, identifies climate change as a strategic 
priority (strong proponent of a carbon tax) 
NDP Left Supports highly progressive vales; generally, a stricter 
approach to economic and environmental regulation, 
proponent of a wealth tax and a heavy emitters tax 
(Sources: Anderson & Stephenson, 2011; McCarthy & Walsh, 2019; McCullough, n.d.) 
The ensuing results are consistent with the traditional left/right dichotomy which is 







policy problems, such as climate change, are largely demonstrative of political ideology whereby 
left-leaning ideologies are more likely to support disaster risk reduction and climate action as 
opposed to those who identify with more right-positioned political groups (Fielding et al., 2012; 
McCright et al., 2016). 
 
4.3 FLOOD POLICY PROBLEMS AND ACTIONS 
 4.3.1 FLOODING AS A POLICY PROBLEM 
The initial results demonstrate that discourse recognizes a policy problem in 40.3% of 
flood references within the sample, with no detectable policy problem in the remaining 59.7%. 
These results are consistent with other research that has been done on discourse and flood policy 
framing. In an analogous study which examines how the media frames flooding a policy 
problem, Thistlethwaite et al. (2019) found policy problems in only 26% of the articles 
examined. While the political discourse studied identifies a higher degree of policy problems 
compared to media discourse, this result should be expected given government is responsible for 
designing and implementing public policy.  
There is, however, evidence within the parliamentary discourse that positively reinforces 
flooding as a policy problem (Table 9).  
Table 9: The most frequently cited policy problems within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard 
Index. 
Policy Problem Sample Text  
Poor Infrastructure 
Management 
“…the current Conservative government's neglect of our city and its critical 
infrastructure needs, such as improved sewer systems, some of which are 




“Owing to predictable flooding of their community, Kashechewan residents 
were evacuated this spring for the fourth consecutive year and for the sixth 
year over the last 10 years” (Y. Jones, 2015, p. 13880) 
Ineffective 
Coordination 
“under the present cost-shared agreement with the province, should a 







among Levels of 
Government  
will only cover to have that culvert replaced to its pre-disaster condition. The 
municipality will be responsible for the cost of the upgrade. This needs to 
change. Rural communities, in particular, cannot afford this cost and cannot 
afford to replace failed infrastructure with more of the same” (Foote, 2010, p. 
4415)  
Climate Change “This is the fourth year in a row we have had what was deemed to be a 100 
year flood. Climate change has moved from being a future threat to a 
present danger. Extreme weather events such as floods are increasing in 
frequency and severity. The Insurance Bureau of Canada recently mapped 
the flood risk for people across the country and found that 19% of Canadian 
households are at some level of risk” (Johns, 2017, p. 15603)  
Lack of Mitigation 
Measures 
“does he feel we need to ensure that we have preventative measures in place 
so we are not just dealing with mitigations and trying to address things after 
the fact, after the damage is done, like groundwater contamination, property 
damage and ongoing infrastructure damage, because of not having that 
foresightedness?” (Bezan, 2006, p. 3141)  
 
Some key policy issues have been identified among Canadian politicians, however, there 
remains the belief that flooding is a “natural” disaster, rather than a lack of effective policy. 
Contributing factors are examined in depth in the following section, Framing Flood Risk, and 
include an analysis of whether flood risk is increasing, manageable/preventable, urgent, as well 
as natural or anthropogenic in origin.  
Over the study period, there is growing identification that flooding is a policy problem as 
of 2016 (Figure 5). This, again, coincides with the major political shifts observed in 2016, such 
as a change in majority government and the implementation of the Paris Agreement. There is a 
statistically significant relation between political party and the identification of a policy problem 
or failure (p= 0.03, Cramer’s V= 0.171). Compared to its counterparts, the Conservative Party is 
less likely to identify a policy problem in association with flooding. Further, throughout recent 
elections, the Liberal Party of Canada has cited climate change action as a policy directive 
(Worland, 2015). As climate change is a policy problem, linking flooding with climate change 







Politically, this may have initiated debates criticizing the previous government’s policies, 
as well as brought attention to the overarching issue of climate change and its contribution to 
severe weather. In that same year, Canada also experienced a series of flood events, with the 
most severe floods occurring in Alberta and British Columbia amounting to $462 million and 
$65 million, respectively (Government of Canada, 2018a). These large-scale flood events could 
have further prompted discussion on flooding and its associated policy problems, further 
emphasizing flood discourse as events based. 
 
Figure 5: The number of flood references within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard Index that 
state a policy problem or failure in connection with flooding throughout the sample period of 2006 to 2020. 1 
indicates the presence of a policy problem and 0 indicates no policy problem or failure stated. 
 
The literature emphasizes flooding is a policy problem. To effectively implement FRM 
policies, there must be widespread recognition among key decision-makers in Canada that floods 



































 4.3.2 ACTION TO REDUCE FLOOD RISK 
In combination with establishing flooding as a policy problem, explicit risk-reducing 
actions are required to effectively manage flood risk. The results show that explicit action to 
reduce overall flood risk is stated in just 36.0% of references within the sample, with the 
remaining 64.0% indicating no concrete action. This indicates that of the flood discourse studied 
within Canadian parliament, the majority lacks tangible risk reduction measures. Again, this is 
fairly consistent with the findings in the media discourse study by Thistlethwaite et al. (2019), 
which found that only 3.0% of the articles studied contained information on decreasing flood 
risk. A statistical analysis revealed that there is no significant correlation between Canadian 
political parties and discourse surrounding action to reduce flood risk. 
While the results from this political discourse study are substantially better than what is 
seen in the media study in terms of discussion surrounding risk mitigation, it still demonstrates a 
need for exhaustive management discussions that are consistent with FRM principles and 
prioritize measures to reduce flood risk. There is, however, evidence within the sample that 
identifies specific action to decrease flood risk, and positively reinforces that there is some 
discussion surrounding the implementation of mitigative strategies. Table 10 summarizes the 
primary measures that are discussed throughout the sample. 
Table 10: The most frequently cited actions to reduce flood risk within the discourse sample from the 




Structural Defenses “The provincial-territorial base fund is supporting upgrades to 
Chilliwack's east dike that will increase flood protection to more than 
40,000 people residing in the flood plain. These upgrades will help 
increase protection for critical infrastructure such as rail lines, the 
Trans-Canada Highway, oil and gas infrastructure, utilities, hospital 










“The national disaster mitigation program, or NDMP, has provided 
funding for 363 flood mitigation projects across Canada… The 
national disaster mitigation program has helped to address rising 
flood risks and costs, and has built the foundation for informed 
mitigation investments to reduce or even negate the effects of flood 
events and climate change” (Boissonnault, 2019, p. 29230) 
Community 
Relocation 
“Since 2016, we have been working in partnership with 
Kashechewan on its request to relocate the community to higher 
ground. The community has chosen the place where they think it 
would be best to relocate. Work is under way to build a new road, 
transfer the land and design the new community” (Trudeau, 2019, p. 
27183) 
Programs to Identify 
High-Risk Regions 
“We funded satellite weather forecasting for early warning and flood 
mapping to enable overland home flood insurance” (Crockatt, 2015, 
p. 14597) 
Despite these actions, most of the sample size excludes policy problem identification and 
concrete action to reduce flood risk. This further emphasises a lack of hazard-based discussion as 
most of the discussion does not account for measures to reduce flood risk prior to a flood event 
occurring. These results are not seen to change substantially over the study period (Appendix C).  
 
4.4 FRAMING FLOOD RISK 
To determine how flood risk is framed and the extent to which these frames align with 
the principles of FRM, the following factors were examined based their presence or absence 
within each reference, (1) flood risk as urgent, (2) flood risk as increasing, (3) flood risk as 
manageable or preventable, (4) flood risk as natural or anthropogenic, and (5) consequences of 
flood framing.  
4.4.1 FLOOD RISK FRAMES 
Evidence of FRM in political discourse should include findings that flood risk is urgent, 
increasing, and manageable. In practice, however, these factors are not highly prevalent within 







frame flood risk as urgent, 33.9% cite flood risk as increasing, and 32.2% frame flooding as 
manageable or preventable. This is indictive of the low saliency of flood risk among politicians. 
Political salience of risk is important as it promotes hazards-based policy decisions and 
prioritizes proactive pre-flood management.  
Moreover, these results demonstrate a disconnect between research and politics. Climate 
change and its role as a catalyst for severe and frequent floods is well-documented in the 
academic literature. Despite this, the majority of discourse in the study did not cite flood risk as 
increasing or urgent. From 2006 to 2020, the number of references that frame flood risk as urgent 
does not change significantly (Appendix D). However, around 2016, there does appear to be a 
growing recognition among politicians that flood risk is increasing (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: The number of flood references within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard Index that 
cite flood risk as increasing (1) or not increasing (0) throughout the sample period of 2006 to 2020.  
 
Additionally, there is no substantial changes in the framing of flood risk as manageable 



































between theoretical FRM policy and FRM in practice. The literature asserts that flood risk is a 
policy problem which can be minimized through effective management practices. However, 
based on the sample, the results suggest that politicians often frame flooding as an uncontrollable 
and unpredictable phenomenon. This could be motivated by political factors, such an 
unwillingness to take the blame for underlying policy problems, political party ideology, or other 
policy interests. Overall, this further emphasizes that discussions on flooding are largely events-
based, as discussions surrounding mitigation and prevention measures imply that flood risk is 
manageable rather than an uncontrollable force of nature. The statistical analysis performed did 
not produce any significant relationships between political party and framing flood risk as 
increasing, manageable or urgent. 
In total, 41.5% of the references within the sample frame flooding as anthropogenic, 
35.6% frame flooding as natural, and 22.9% state neither as an origin of flood risk. Of the 
references frame flood risk as natural, 58.7% identify flooding as an “Act of God”, and 41.7% 
frame flooding as geophysical in origin (encompassing seasonal snow melt, high tide, instances 
of heavy rainfall, etc.). While the discourse commonly embraces an anthropogenic frame, a 
substantial proportion of the references as describe flooding as natural in origin. This indicates 
that there is still a high prevalence of discussions that frame flood risk as inevitable and 
unstoppable. Some sample quotes which that demonstrate this frame include,  
• “Natural disasters are unfortunately not predictable or controllable. However, the 
assistance provided by emergency personnel enables disaster victims to get the care and 
services they need” (D’Amours, 2008, p. 5990) 
• “some people in eastern Canada are currently going through tough times because of 
Mother Nature's wrath, which has caused abnormal flooding in residential areas. Those 
affected are facing situations beyond their control that are putting their properties and 







This discourse is unproductive, and is even injurious, to sustainable flood policy as it 
promotes a reliance on post-disaster assistance rather than mitigative measures, absolves 
politicians of the responsibility to manage flood risk, and shifts the blame away from poor policy 
decisions.  
However, there is a growing recognition of flooding as human-induced, particularly 
towards the end of the study period. This shows that there is an acknowledgement that human-
induced policy problems, such as poor infrastructure development, ineffective land use zoning, 
as well as climate change, are driving instances of severe and frequent floods. This starts to 
increase in prevalence in 2016 and does not start to become a dominant perspective until 2018 
(Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: The number of flood references within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard Index that 




































This timeline is consistent with other instances of discussion that are productive to FRM, 
such as the recognition of a policy problem or failure, and the identification of flood risk as 
increasing. The year 2016 coincides with several political events, such as a change in 
government from the more fundamentalist-positioned Conservative Party of Canada to the more 
progressive Liberal Party of Canada, who have placed climate action at the forefront of their 
election campaigns. The statistical analysis performed on the data determined that there is a 
significant relationship between political party and the framing of flood risk as natural or 
anthropogenic (p= 0.0001, Cramer’s V= 0.248), with Chi-Square residuals showing that 
members of the NDP Party strongly tend towards framing flood risk as anthropogenic and away 
from framing flood risk as natural, whereas the Conservatives did not frame flood risk as 
anthropogenically-induced. Therefore, the ideology of flood risk as human-induced could have 
grown as the more “left-aligned” Liberals became a majority government. This timing also 
coincides with the implementation of the Paris Agreement, which could have further spurred 
recognition of climate change as a contributor to flood events.  
Additionally, the Canadian Disaster Database reported 7 flood events in 2016 with events 
in the Maritimes, Alberta and British Columbia amounting to over $558 million, which could 
have further prompted discussions around mitigations and improving resilience to flooding 
(Government of Canada, 2018a). Despite these progressions, the results suggest that FRM 
remains conceptual rather than referenced as a tangible policy directive.  
The results also show that the Canadian political parties vary in their focus of FRM. 
Overall, mitigation is discussed the most with 38.5% of the references focusing mitigative or 
preventative measures, followed by 32.6% focusing on response, 28.8% focusing on recovery, 







and response comprise the majority. This is likely due to a heavy dependence on funding 
structural defenses, funding prevention/mitigation programs, as well as coordinating emergency 
response efforts during a flood event. 
Specific to each party, the results show that the Conservative Party places a large 
emphasis on recovery and mitigation. Liberals, comparatively, focus on response and mitigation, 
which the NDP prioritize mitigation, response, and recovery (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: The five political parties within the Canadian Hansard Index that contributed to flood discourse 
within the sample and the associated aspect of FRM (preparedness (PREP), mitigation (MIT), response (RES), 
recovery (REC), none (0)) that is highlighted in each reference studied. 
 
In this case, it is important to point out that mitigation also includes preventative 
measures such as structural defenses, which are important aspects of flood management but are 
often too heavily relied upon and rely on traditional methods of ‘controlling’ floods (Henstra & 
































































Overall, the data shows that all of the aspects of FRM are being represented within 
discourse. However, there is a lack of emphasis on preparedness, which gives affected regions 
the ability to anticipate and develop a plan for response and recovery efforts to minimize the 
overall cost of flooding.  
 4.4.2 FRAMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODS 
In addition to framing the causes and characteristics of flood risk, it is important that the 
consequences of flood risk also align with the principles of FRM. Fundamentally, effective FRM 
requires a whole-of-society approach and frames flood risk as a societal issue, rather than just a 
hazard. Therefore, it takes incorporates a multi-faceted view of costs that are endured after a 
flood event. One of the main criticisms of the current flood management system in Canada is that 
a large emphasis is placed on recovering costs post-flood through programs, such as DFAA 
(Sandink et al., 2016; Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 2017). This is becoming financially 
unsustainable with mounting instances of severe flood events. Larg2021-09-02 6:19:00 PMely, 
this reflects how governments prioritize the financial and economic consequences of flooding. 
The results, however, indicate that there are discussions occurring on a parliamentary 
level that consider the multi-faceted consequences of flooding. Based on a binary examination of 
each consequence of flood risk, it was found that 49.6% of the results state economic 
consequences of flooding (ex. lost business, financial compensation for losses, property loss, 
etc.), 47.0% of the results describe social costs of flooding (ex. effects on health and mental 
health, loss of home, etc.), and 47.0% state political/partisan consequences (ex. enactment or 
alterations to existing policies, criticism of government policies, etc.). Overall, these dimensions 
that encompass the consequences of flooding are similarly represented throughout the sample 








Figure 9: The number of references within the sample that frame (1) or do not frame (0) the consequences of 
flooding as social, economic or political-partisan. 
 
While it is encouraging to see that there is an array of consequences prevalent in flood 
discourse, there remains the need to incorporate more discussion surrounding the consequences 
of flooding. Approximately half of the references within the study do not refer to any economic, 
societal, or political/partisan effects. It is important that the consequences of flooding are at the 
basis of flood management discussions as it indicates a recognition of the broader impacts of 
flooding, such as equity and the long-term impacts of a flood event on communities. This 
suggests that in these instances, discourse focuses on the hazard, without referencing the greater 
societal implications that occurs after a flood event.  
 
4.5 INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES AND FLOOD RISK 
In Canada, Indigenous communities are disproportionately exposed to flood risk. The 
literature indicates that this is due to a lack of access to risk assessment resources pertaining to 







susceptibility to annual flooding. In fact, 22% of Indigenous lands are prone to 1-in-100 year 
flood events, rendering them the most frequently flooded land (Thistlethwaite et al., 2020). This 
is exacerbated by repeated evacuation, relocation, and destruction of property which contributes 
to a variety of economic and social costs (Thistlethwaite et al., 2020). 
Despite being a population that endures the most flood events within Canada, only 17.8% 
of the references cite Indigenous communities in flood discussions. Of these references, 73.8% 
are framed with a negative connotation, indicating that these communities are adversely affected 
by flooding. Indigenous communities are a good proxy for determining vulnerability in flood 
discussions as they are marginalized through colonialism and racism and have traditionally had 
little representation in policy processes, rendering these communities with a lack of adaptive 
capacity in the face of flooding (Haalboom & Natcher, 2012). Overall, the results signify that 
vulnerability does not play a large role in motivating discussions around flood risk.  
However, the consideration of vulnerability is essential in enacting effective FRM policy. 
Risk literature cites vulnerability as key in managing hazards as small disturbances can have 
catastrophic impacts with a lack of action to mitigate these changes (Folke, 2006). Despite this 
being prevalent within risk management research, this is not being seen in practice, particularly 
with regards to Indigenous communities. This further indicates that vulnerability, in conjunction 
with other principles of FRM, remain conceptual rather than an explicit framework being used to 
enact sustainable flood management policies, and justifies more work on prioritizing vulnerable 
communities in flood discourse. 
FRM also requires a broad range of stakeholders to inform well-rounded policies. The 
results show that Indigenous communities are positively represented in only 26.2% of 







involvement of Indigenous stakeholders in management decisions, community consultation, as 
well as the implementation of measures that align with the stages of FRM (i.e., preparedness, 
mitigation/prevention, response, recovery). Since Indigenous communities experience the 
highest instances of flooding in Canada, there is a need for more inclusion of these communities 
as key stakeholders in flood management discussions.  
 
4.6 CLIMATE CHANGE AND FLOOD FRAMING 
Climate change is one of the main drivers of increasing and severe instances of flooding 
in Canada. This recognition among politicians is critical in understanding the underlying causes 
of flood risk, the long-term costs of flooding, as well as the recognition that this is a phenomenon 
that is going to increase in frequency and severity. Therefore, it requires effective 
implementation of risk-reducing measures to mitigate flood events. Further, it emphasizes the 
understanding of the interconnectivity of flood risk and climate change, and the need for climate 
action in conjunction with flood-specific mitigation measures to effectively reduce flood risk. 
The results found that climate change is not widely cited as a contributing factor to flood 
risk throughout the study period. Overall, only 27.5% of the references within the sample cite 
climate change as a driver of flood risk. Of these references, 7.7% identify climate change as 
currently contributing to flooding, whereas 92.3% identify it as a future driver of flood risk. The 
results of this study are comparable with those found in the media frames study by Thistlethwaite 
et al. (2019), which determined that flood was linked to climate change in only 6% of the media 
sources studied.  
This signifies that flood risk has not been widely discussed in conjunction with climate 







than a current policy problem. This takes away from the urgency of the issue and implementing 
associated management strategies. Additionally, linking flood risk with climate change gives the 
issue political salience as it extends beyond isolated events. Rather, it gives a narrative of a 
repetitive and increasing event that affects a wide variety of stakeholders and thus requires 
attention from policy-makers (Crow et al., 2017; Escobar & Demeritt, 2014; Thistlethwaite et al., 
2019).  
There is a shift in climate change framing and flood risk towards the end of the study 
period. As is seen with other policy issues throughout this study, 2016 marks an increase in the 
number of references that cite climate change as a contributing factor to flood risk (Figure 10). 
This aligns with large shifts in international climate policy, such as the Paris Agreement. Further, 
this timing marks the change in majority government, from the Conservative Party of Canada to 
the Liberal Party of Canada, who have prioritized climate action throughout their 2015 campaign 
(Worland, 2015). The data demonstrates a statistically significant relation between political party 
and climate change framing (p= 0.028, Cramer’s V= 0.181), whereby the Conservative Party is 
less likely to associate climate change as a contributing factor to flood risk, compared to its 








Figure 10: The number of flood references within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard Index that 
frame climate change as a contributing factor to flooding (1) or not a contributing factor to flooding (0) 
throughout the sample period of 2006 to 2020. 
 
Therefore, the switch in government could have contributed to an increase in climate 
change discussion towards the four years of the sample period. Overall, while there has been an 
increase in flood framing and its connection to climate change, the results indicate that this is 
only a recent development. There is a need for a multi-sector approach to flood management, and 
a widespread recognition among elected officials that instances of frequent and severe flood 
events are linked to climate change.  
 
4.7 GOVERNMENT, STAKEHOLDERS AND FLOOD RISK 
Another key principle of FRM is that it incorporates a wide variety of stakeholders 



































sustainable flood management through sharing recovery and mitigation actions, as well as 
minimizing the burden on high-risk and vulnerable communities. While government entities play 
a key role in flood management efforts, there has been criticisms that there is too much reliance 
on government disaster financial assistance programs and structural defenses, and not enough 
focus on rebuilding to improve resilience, non-structural defenses and incorporating private 
entities (such as insurers) in flood management strategies (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a). 
Further, it has been stated that there is too much reliance on the higher levels of government in 
Canada, with municipalities and insurers being under-utilized in cost- and risk-sharing programs 
(Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 2017).  
 4.7.1 GOVERNMENT ACTORS 
The levels of government in Canada (federal, provincial, and municipal) that are 
mentioned as having identified involvement in flood management and risk-reducing efforts were 
examined. Within the sample, 70.3% of the references identify the federal government as 
partaking in flood management, 47.5% indicate the provincial government, and only 21.6% 
highlight the municipal government as a risk-sharing actor. While the large proportion of federal 
government identification could be in part due to the nature of the study focusing on 
parliamentary discourse within the House of Commons, it is important to note that the provincial 
government is stated more often in cost-sharing programs and recovery efforts, as opposed to the 
municipal government. This is significant as it reinforces municipalities as an under-utilized 
actor in national flood management and risk sharing strategies, particularly at a local level to 
enforce measures such as zoning and land use regulations, community-level management, 







Additionally, the involvement of government-specific programs, policies and 
organizations was examined. It was found that 44.9% of the references within the study state 
specific government ministry or organization involvement in flood management efforts. This is 
indictive that a substantial proportion of flood risk is linked to a government organization and 
demonstrates accountability and responsibility. Of the entities mentioned, the most commonly 
cited ones include the Canadian Forces (15.7%), Public Safety Canada (15.7%), and local first 
responders (14.0%). Further, 25.0% of references within the sample identify a specific 
government program or policy within the discussion. The most mentioned programs include, 
Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) (9.3%), National Disaster Mitigation 
Program (NDMP) (3.8%), and the Disaster Adaptation Mitigation Fund (DMAF) (3.4%). For the 
most part, these programs were positively discussed, rather than criticized.  
These results indicate that response- and recovery-focused agencies represent the largest 
proportion of government actors that are cited within the sample. This reinforces that discussion 
about flood risk are events-based. Emergency response agencies comprise the most frequently 
mentioned organizations. These organizations respond during or after a flood event. 
Additionally, DFAA is the most cited government program, highlighting that there is a heavy 
reliance on government-funded financing post flood. Despite its financial caveats, it is possible 
that politicians still rely on this program to gain public support as there remains a widespread 
expectation that the government will cover costs post-flood. This does little to incentivize 
personal uptake of insurance and property-level protection measures. The uptake of these risk-
reducing measures are highly dependent on a society’s perception of risk and values regarding 







2008). Overall, these results indicate that there remains a need to shift towards diversifying risk-
reducing programs and incorporating all levels of government in risk-sharing measures. 
 4.7.2 STAKEHOLDERS AND FLOOD RISK 
Throughout the sample, a variety of stakeholders and associated roles are identified 
(Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: The stakeholders that are stated within the discourse sample in connection with flooding, cited as 
having either a negative (N) or positive (P) role in flood management. 
 
While this demonstrates that flood risk is diversified among various actors, there remains 
a disproportionate emphasis on several stakeholders. These include the federal, provincial, and 
municipal governments, which comprise the vast majority of stakeholders mentioned, as well as 
first responders and local residents.  
Additionally, upon examination of the functions of these stakeholders, it was found that 
the most prevalent roles cited throughout the sample include emergency response (35.6%), 
financing post-flood (25.8%), funding risk-reduction programs (22.9%), climate action (15.7%), 
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flood defense infrastructure (12.7%), infrastructure reinforcement (11.4%), and evacuation 
(10.2%) (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: The number of references containing each stakeholder role or function within the discourse sample. 
 
Again, response and recovery efforts, including emergency response, recovering costs, 
and evacuation make up the majority of stakeholder roles. However, stakeholder roles that are 
conducive to flood mitigation are also prevalent within the discussion, including funding risk 
management programs, as well as re-enforcing infrastructure to withstand floods. This is 
consistent with the FRM principles that are most mentioned within the sample, including 
mitigation, response and recovery as stated previously.  
Overall, these results indicate that discourse needs to be more wide-reaching to 
encompass actions that are proactive to all aspects of FRM (such as more emphasis on 
preparedness), as well as the need for discussion that prioritizes sharing responsibility among all 







stakeholders which can help guide effective mitigation strategies and cost-share recovery efforts, 
such as Indigenous representatives, insurers, and NGOs.  
 
4.8 SUMMARY 
Overall, the results present several main findings. Overwhelmingly, the year 2016 marks 
an ideological shift in many of the FRM variables studied, including the identification of climate 
change as a driver of flood risk, the recognition that flood risk is anthropogenic, that flood risk is 
increasing, framing the consequences of flooding as long term, as well as the statement of a 
policy problem or failure associated with flooding. This demonstrates a tendency towards frames 
that align with FRM beginning in 2016. As previously stated, this timeline coincides with large-
scale political changes, including a change in power to the left-leaning Liberal Party of Canada, 
as well as the enaction of the Paris Agreement. The relation between these events and the change 
in ideology implies that large-scale political changes are key drivers of FRM frame shifts.  
Further, the results suggest that politics, rather than flood risk, are at the basis of the 
discourse studied. The findings show that discussions are largely initiated by the onset of a flood 
event, and that the priority by which regions are discussed is based on representation within the 
House of Commons, rather than risk-based metrics such as the frequency and severity of flood 
events. The findings also demonstrate that flood discourse is largely events-based, which shows 
a tendency of politicians to react to flooding rather than initiate discussions based on flood risk 
and climate change mitigation. Additionally, the results are consistent with left-right politics 
theory, which identifies left-leaning parties as more receptive to environmental issues, and more 







 The results indicate is a need for more focus on several aspects of FRM. The first is 
vulnerability as indicated through a lack of discourse and flood risk for Indigenous communities, 
despite being at a significantly increased risk of flooding. Further, there is a lack of discourse 
surrounding explicit action to reduce flood risk, which signifies that more definite policy 
directives are needed to improve flood management strategies.  Finally, the results demonstrate 
the need for a diversification of policies and stakeholders in Canadian flood management 
strategies. The discourse reveals a heavy reliance on government-funded recovery programs, and 
on government stakeholders. Effective FRM policy requires a variety of stakeholders and 
programs to distribute flood risk. Further, the literature identifies tools, such as flood insurance, 
that are critical in sustainable flood policy. Despite this, these tools are scarcely mentioned in the 




















 It is becoming evident that current flood management strategies are no longer sustainable 
in Canada. Floods are more frequent and severe in light of climate change and are associated 
with mounting economic and social costs. Traditional, hazard-based strategies have become 
outdated, along with the frame that flooding is a non-predictable phenomenon which can be 
largely controlled through structural defenses. The literature has shown that these methods fail to 
account for key elements of risk, including exposure and vulnerability, as well as resilience and 
adaptation. Further, they are reliant on metrics such as specified return intervals, which does not 
account for the rapid changes that are occurring as global temperatures increase (Henstra & 
Thistlethwaite, 2017a).  
Additionally, there has been a disproportionate emphasis put on federal cost recovery 
programs, namely DFAA, which has been criticized for its long term viability, and limits 
stakeholders and programs involved in flood management (Sandink et al., 2016; Thistlethwaite 
& Henstra, 2017). Other valuable stakeholders, such as insurers, local governments, and local 
communities, have traditionally been overlooked in flood mitigation and recovery procedures. 
As result, tools that are identified as key to a well-rounded flood strategy such as flood 
insurance, land use and zoning, property-level protection measures, and flood mapping have 
been under-utilized (Oulahen, 2014; Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 2017).  
 The literature identifies FRM as an effective and viable strategy for flood management 
policy. FRM provides several factors that highlight it as a sustainable policy framework. First, it 
uses risk-based metrics to account for risk disparities and populations more susceptible to flood 
risk (Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a; Nelson et al., 2007). Second, it prioritizes risk-sharing 







distribute the efforts required before, during and after a flood occurs (Thistlethwaite & Henstra, 
2017). Third, it asserts that flooding is inherently a public policy problem that requires tangible 
action at all management stages to minimize risk (Gober & Wheater, 2015; Henstra & 
Thistlethwaite, 2017a). Fourth, it is adaptive and employs a broad range of tools to better prepare 
for and improve resilience against floods (Thistlethwaite, Henstra, et al., 2018). Overall, FRM 
aims to manage flood risk so that it is reduced to a level which is economically and socially 
acceptable (Bowles, 2003; Henstra & Thistlethwaite, 2017a; Schanze et al., 2006).  
 Despite its prevalence in flood policy research, FRM implementation in Canada has been 
slow. This research examined flood discourse at within the Canadian House of Commons to 
determine the predominant frames that exist within political discourse, as well as the extent to 
which they are consistent with FRM. This research set out to determine (1) how Canadian 
political discourse frames flooding as a policy problem, and (2) the role of FRM in Canadian 
policy discourse.  
 This research began by undertaking a literature review examined the current state of 
flooding and flood policy in Canada. This highlighted the criticisms of traditional flood 
management practices. FRM theory was then summarized, allowing for an examination of the 
main elements of FRM, as well as its role in implementing effective flood policy in Canada. 
Discourse theory and the influence of media, left-right politics and public opinion in enacting 
public policy was examined to deduce the ways in which salience is placed on political issues.  
 The literature review informed the development of a codebook, in order to evaluate the 
prevalence of FRM in political discourse in practice. This codebook was applied to flood 
discourse samples extracted from the Hansard Index of the Canadian House of Commons. The 







Party Speaking on Flooding, (3) Problem Framing, (4) Climate Change Framing (5) Flood Risk 
Management Focus, and (6) Stakeholder Identification.   
 Overall, the results indicate that policy discourse does well to highlight several 
components of FRM, including mitigation, response, and recovery. There is also a recognition 
towards the end of the study period that flood risk is a result of human-induced policy problems, 
climate change, and that flood risk is increasing. There are several main themes that are apparent 
within the results. 
First, the results suggest that flood discourse is largely event-based, rather than risk 
based. This indicates that discussions surrounding flooding are initiated by the occurrence of a 
flood event. The data shows that there are some connections between the severity of flood events 
by province and the frequency of province mentions within the discussions. In other words, 
provinces that experience more costly floods showed up more frequently within the discourse. 
Events-based dialogue is evident throughout, which suggests that discussions are spurred by 
flood events. This is apparent as the majority of discussions do not identify flooding as a result of 
poor policy, and a tendency to focus on the immediate consequences of flooding, rather than the 
long-term effects. Further, the prevalence of programs such as the DFAA throughout the 
discourse suggests that flood policies are largely focused on efforts post-flood. 
 Second, the results imply that major political events are drivers of a change in discourse. 
Factors including the temporal framing of flood consequences, the identification of a policy 
problem or failure, the state of flood risk as increasing, the origin of flood risk as anthropogenic, 
and the identification of climate change as a contributing factor to flood risk all show a shift 
towards FRM-based frames in the year 2016. In that time period, several large political changes 







campaigned for climate action, as well as the implementation of the Paris Agreement (an 
international climate policy). These changes could have prompted discussion on underlying 
policy problems that are exacerbating flood risk, resulting in unsustainable costs to governments 
as well as taxpayers. 
 Third, the results show that political representation and ideology influences flood 
discourse. The data confirms that provinces that are most frequently referenced within 
discussions have the most political representation within the House of Commons. The results are 
also consistent with political ideology literature, which states a tendency of right-leaning 
conservatives to resist progressive environmental policies and negate climate change as a policy 
problem. Statistical analysis showed significant correlations between dialogue from conservative 
representatives and a tendency away from anthropogenic-induced flood risk, not stating that 
climate change is a contributing factor to flood risk, a lack of statement that flooding is a result 
of a policy problem, and a tendency to frame the effects of flooding as short term. Contrastingly, 
the farther left-leaning NDPs showed a tendency to frame flood risk as anthropogenic. This 
suggests that party ideology is indicative of a tendency to support frames that are conducive to 
FRM and has implications for the enactment of policies that are conducive to FRM based on 
which party has a majority government. In particular, ideology aligns with one of FRM’s 
founding principles that flood risk is not inevitable and can be managed using public policy.  
 Finally, the results show that despite the recent shifts in discourse that is proactive to 
FRM, there remains several policy considerations that need to be met to effectively implement 
sustainable flood management policy. Stakeholder diversification is a key principle of FRM and 
allows for effective risk- and cost-sharing. The discourse sample studied frequently cites only a 







government in flood management. The roles of these stakeholders are largely focused on 
recovery and recovery, rather than mitigation and preparedness. Additionally, the results show a 
need for more consideration for vulnerable populations throughout the discourse. This is evident 
by the representation of indigenous communities, whose lands are the most frequently flooded, 
have little representation within the discourse. There is a need for more political discourse 
frames which are consistent with FRM literature. These include the recognition that climate 
change is a current contributor to flood risk, rather than a future contributor. Further, there 
remains low recognition of flood risk as urgent and as manageable, as well as explicit action 
stated to reduce flood risk.  
 This study provides a robust framework for evaluating flood risk frames and the extent to 
which FRM is prevalent in policy discourse, however the design of the study presents several 
limitations. The first is the use of a single coder. This presents challenges with reliability and 
subjectivity in the application and interpretation of the codebook. The drawbacks of using a 
single coder were addressed through clearly defining the criteria for each node prior to applying 
the codebook to the sample. Secondly, the codebook presents issues for generality. The 
codebook was designed specifically to evaluate FRM in Canada on a national scale. For this 
study to be replicated, the codebook would need to be modified to allow for broader research 
applications. 
This research contributes to an improved understanding of FRM in practice. Specifically, 
it highlights the elements of FRM that are prevalent within political discourse and those that 
remain priorities to implement a sustainable flood management framework in Canada. This study 
can be expanded upon to evaluate the prevalence of other natural hazards management theories 







hurricanes, etc. This codebook can also be applied to examine FRM implementation in other 
levels of Canadian government, through a provincial discourse analysis. This would allow for a 
greater understanding of the distribution of flood management efforts throughout Canada. It can 
also be expanded to an international study to determine flood management policy frameworks in 
other countries. Expansion of this study could allow for an improved understanding of effective 
flood policy implementation in light of changing climatic conditions and rising global 
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APPENDIX A: CODEBOOK SUMMARY 
Table 11: The number of references for each node and associated sub nodes in the codebook developed for this study. 
Name Description Files References 
City 
0  113 175 
BEAUCE Beauce 1 1 
BRAM Brampton 1 1 
BURL Burlington 2 2 
CAL Calgary 7 8 
CAPEB Cape Breton 1 2 
CHILL Chilliwack 1 1 
CORB Corner Brook 1 1 
EDM Edmonton 0 0 
FORTA Fort Albany 1 1 
FORTM Fort McMurray 0 0 
FRED Frederickton 3 3 
GASPE Gaspe 2 2 
GAT Gatineau 1 1 
GRANBY Granby, Quebec 1 1 
HIGHR High River 1 1 







Name Description Files References 
LAV Laval 1 1 
MACL Macleod, AB 1 1 
MONT Monteregie 10 12 
MTL Montreal 2 2 
OTT Ottawa 2 2 
QUEBC Quebec City 2 2 
RICHM Richmond Hill 1 1 
RIG Rigaud 1 1 
RIV Riviere au Renard 3 3 
ST JOH St. John (New Brunswick) 3 3 
THUN Thunder Bay 1 1 
TOR Toronto 6 6 
VAN Vancouver 0 0 
WHIT Whitby 1 1 
WIN Winnipeg 4 4 
WIND Windsor 1 1 
Consequences of Flood Framing 
Economic 
0 No 73 119 
1 Yes 95 117 
Political-Partisan 







Name Description Files References 
1 Yes 83 111 
Social  0 0 
0 No 95 125 
1 Yes 81 111 
Explicit Action to Reduce Flood Risk 
0 No 106 151 
1 Yes 62 85 
Flood Risk as Increasing 
0 No 112 156 
1 Yes 55 80 
Flood Risk as Manageable or Preventable 
0 No 109 160 
1 Yes 57 76 
Flood Risk as Natural or Anthropogenic 
0 None 47 54 
Anthropogenic  68 98 
Natural  65 84 
Act of God  37 49 
GeoPhysical  34 35 
Flood Risk as Urgent 
0  123 189 







Name Description Files References 
Focus In Terms of FRM 
0 None 23 25 
MIT Mitigation/Prevention 63 91 
PREP Preparedness 22 27 
REC Recovery 65 68 
RES Response 48 77 
Indigenous Communities Linked with Flooding 
0 No 120 194 
1 Yes 39 42 
Negative  30 31 
Positive  11 11 
Mention of Climate Change as a Contributing Factor 
0 No 122 171 
1 Yes 45 65 
Future  5 5 
Present  41 60 
Ministry or Government Organization Linked with the Discussion 
0 No 95 130 
1 Yes 79 106 
Canada Water Agency  2 3 
Canadian Centre for Climate Change Services  1 1 







Name Description Files References 
Canadian Foundation for Climate and 
Atmospheric Sciences 
 1 1 
Coast Guard  4 6 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans  2 2 
Department of Indigenous Affairs and Northern 
Development 
 4 4 
Department of National Defense  2 2 
Department of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness 
 1 1 
Emergency Management Ontario  1 1 
Environment Canada  3 3 
Government Operations Centre  8 8 
Health Canada  2 2 
Hydro Quebec  1 1 
Infrastructure Canada  1 1 
Insurance Bureau of Canada  3 3 
Interdisciplinary Task Force on Flood Insurance 
and Relocation 
 1 1 
International Joint Commission  3 4 
Keystone Agriculture Producers of Manitoba  1 1 
Local First Responders The Red Cross, Fire Department, Police Forces, Emergency Medical 
Services  
25 33 
Ministere de la Securite Publique de Quebec  1 1 







Name Description Files References 
Natural Resources Canada  1 1 
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources  2 2 
Ontario Power Generation  1 1 
Parks Canada  1 1 
Parliamentary Budget Office  1 1 
Prince Albert Grand Council  1 1 
Public Safety Canada  32 37 
Public Services and Procurement Canada  1 1 
RCMP  2 2 
Saskatchewan Public Safety Department  1 1 
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority  1 1 
The Federation of Canadian Municipalities  4 4 
Toronto Region Conservation Authority  2 2 
Party Speaking On Flooding 
Member of Government 
0 No 0 0 
1 Yes 149 236 
Member of Cabinet 
0 No 140 216 
1 Yes 17 20 
Member of Opposition 







Name Description Files References 
1 Yes 32 38 
Political Party 
BLQ Bloc Quebecois 13 14 
CPC Conservative Party of Canada 47 54 
GRP Green Party of Canada 2 2 
IND Independent 3 3 
LIB Liberal Party of Canada 63 98 
NDP New Democratic Party 58 65 
Policy Problem or Failure Stated 
0 No 99 141 
1 Yes 73 95 
Province 
0 None 30 46 
AB Alberta 16 17 
BC British Columbia 19 23 
MB Manitoba 25 27 
NB New Brunswick 18 27 
NL Newfoundland 3 3 
NS Nova Scotia 3 4 
NU Nunavut 0 0 
NWT Northwest Territories 1 1 







Name Description Files References 
PEI Prince Edward Island 1 1 
QC Quebec 46 70 
SK Saskatchewan 5 5 
YK Yukon 1 1 
Specific Flood Referenced 
0 No 60 83 
1 Yes 108 153 
Specific Government Programs or Policies Identified 
0 No 118 177 
1 Yes 54 59 
Agri-Recovery 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 2 2 
Building Canada Fund 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 1 1 
Canada Economic Development 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 4 4 
Canada Water Act 
N Negative 1 1 







Name Description Files References 
Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization (CAIS) 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 1 1 
Cover Crop Program 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 2 2 
Crop Insurance 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 1 1 
Disaster Assistance Program 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 1 1 
Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) 
N Negative 4 4 
P Positive 18 18 
Disaster Mitigation and Adaptation Fund (DMAF) 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 7 8 
Economic Action Plan 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 3 3 







Name Description Files References 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 1 1 
Emergency Measures Act 
N Negative 1 1 
P Positive 1 1 
Emergency Preparedness Act 
N Negative 2 2 
P Positive 0 0 
Environmental Enforcement Act 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 1 1 
Federal Carbon Tax 
N Negative 2 2 
P Positive 0 0 
Federal Disaster Fund 
N Negative 1 1 
P Positive 0 0 
Federal Sustainable Development Strategy 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive  1 1 
Federal Tax Deferral Program (Taxpayer relief post-disaster through the CRA) 







Name Description Files References 
P  1 1 
Mitigation Contribution Program (Levels of government to cost share eligible permanent flood mitigation measures) 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 1 1 
Municipalities for Climate Innovation Program 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive  1 1 
National Disaster Mitigation Program (NDMP) 
N Negative 1 1 
P Positive 7 8 
National Flood Insurance Program 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive  3 3 
Navigable Waters Protection Act 
N Negative 1 1 
P Positive  0 0 
Pan-Canadian Framework 
N Negative 1 1 
P Positive  2 2 
Provincial-Territorial Base Fund 
N Negative 0 0 







Name Description Files References 
Round Table on Flooding 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive 1 1 
Shoreline Protection Program 
N Negative 0 0 
P Positive  4 4 
Stakeholder Identification 
0 No 7 7 
1 Yes 146 229 
Levels of Government to Share Flood Risk 
0 No 38 49 
1 Yes 130 180 
FED Federal 121 166 
MUN Municipal 44 51 
PRO Provincial 89 112 
Stakeholder 
N Negative 
Coastal Communities  4 5 
Federal Government  73 82 
Insurers  1 1 
Large Company or Corporation  1 1 







Name Description Files References 
Northern Communities  2 2 
Provincial Government  13 14 
United States Government  0 0 
P Positive 
Academic Researchers  2 2 
Federal Government  76 115 
First Nations Representative  23 23 
First Responders  27 43 
Insurers  10 10 
Large Company or Corporation  0 0 
Local Residents  31 41 
Municipal Government  42 52 
NGOs  3 3 
Provincial Government  71 92 
United States Government  1 1 
Stakeholder Role or Function 
0 No 3 3 
1 Yes 143 226 
Climate Action  26 37 
Community Outreach (Includes public consultation, education initiatives, community-based 
management) 
7 7 
Develop a National Flood Plan  3 3 







Name Description Files References 
Emergency Preparedness  12 15 
Emergency Response  53 84 
Evacuation  21 24 
Financing Post Flood  56 61 
Flood Defense Infrastructure  28 30 
Flood Insurance  4 4 
Flood Mapping  10 10 
Flood Plain and Watershed Management  8 10 
Funding for Emergency Response Volunteer 
Organizations 
 4 4 
Funding Risk Reduction Programs  44 54 
Indigenous Relations  3 3 
Infrastructure Reinforcement  22 27 
Land Use & Zoning  5 6 
Policy Reformation  3 4 
Property Buyouts  2 2 
Rebuilding  18 18 
Relocation  12 13 
Research & Development  5 8 
Satellite Weather Forecasting & Warning  1 1 
Telecommunications Implementation  1 1 








Name Description Files References 
Framing of Consequences 
Long Term  74 112 
Short Term  91 124 
Temporal Scale of Discussion 
Future  36 43 



























APPENDIX B: TEMPORAL ASPECTS OVER STUDY PERIOD (2006-2020) 
 
 
Figure 13:The number of flood references within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard Index that 


























































Figure 14: The number of flood references within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard Index that 
state explicit action (1) or do not state explicit action (0) to reduce flood risk throughout the sample period of 























APPENDIX D: FLOOD RISK AS URGENT OVER THE STUDY PERIOD (2006-2020) 
 
 
Figure 15: The number of flood references within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard Index that 


























































Figure 16: The number of flood references within the discourse sample from the Canadian Hansard Index that 
frame flood risk as manageable (1) or do not frame flood risk as manageable (0) throughout the sample period 
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